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Abstract
Malicious software (malware) has become a prominent fixture in computing. There have
been many methods developed over the years to combat the spread of malware, but these
methods have inevitably been met with countermeasures. For instance, signature-based
malware detection gave rise to polymorphic viruses. This “arms race” will undoubtedly
continue for the foreseeable future as the incentives to develop novel malware continue to
outweigh the costs.
In this dissertation, I describe analysis frameworks for three important problems related
to malware: classification, clustering, and phylogenetic reconstruction. The important com-
ponent of my methods is that they all take into account multiple views of malware. Typically,
analysis has been performed in either the static domain (e.g. the byte information of the
executable) or the dynamic domain (e.g. system call traces). This dissertation develops
frameworks that can easily incorporate well-studied views from both domains, as well as
any new views that may become popular in the future. The only restriction that must be
met is that a positive semidefinite similarity (kernel) matrix must be defined on the view, a
restriction that is easily met in practice.
vi
While the classification problem can be solved with well known multiple kernel learning
techniques, the clustering and phylogenetic problems required the development of novel
machine learning methods, which I present in this dissertation. It is important to note that
although these methods were developed in the context of the malware problem, they are
applicable to a wide variety of domains.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the second quarter of 2013, McAfee labs catalogued more than 18.5 million new malware
samples [76]. Despite the fact that the majority of this new malware is being created through
polymorphism and code obfuscation techniques [67], and thus is similar to known malware, it
is still not detected by signature-based antivirus programs [25,84]. To meet these challenges,
machine learning techniques have been developed that can learn a generalized description
of malware and apply this knowledge to classify/cluster new, unseen instances of malware
[1, 11,65,67].
This dissertation is concerned with representing malicious code in a way that allows
classifying and clustering algorithms to be more robust against code obfuscation techniques.
I approach this problem in two ways. The first is to find a new data representation which
can better capture the information within a given data view, e.g. the dynamic instruction
trace or byte sequences of the binary, allowing for a more accurate classification or clustering
system. The second approach is to use multiple data views. Different data views provide
complementary information about the true nature of a program, but no one data view
contains all of this information. By looking at multiple views of a program, such as the
dynamic trace and the binary, the program’s true intentions become more clear. In this
1
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dissertation, I show that the multiview paradigm does increase the performance on several
important problems.
Given the data views and the data representation, I develop and apply machine learning
algorithms to solve three important problems in the malware domain: classification, clus-
tering, and phylogenetic reconstruction. To classify new instances as malicious or benign,
I begin by defining a kernel [22], a positive semi-definite matrix where each entry in the
matrix is a measure of similarity between a pair of instances in the dataset, one matrix for
each data view. I then use multiple kernel learning [9,101] to find the weights of each kernel,
create a linear combination of the kernels, and finally use a support vector machine [22] to
perform classification.
Many researchers have used k-means or hierarchical clustering algorithms to group mal-
ware together that exhibit similar functionality. I extend this research by introducing a
novel multiple kernel learning algorithm based on a clustering objective function. With
my method, I can combine multiple data views in a way that is relevant to the clustering
problem.
I also approach clustering in a different way which allows for better attribution of the
malware and allows reverse engineers to more quickly understand how a given piece of mal-
ware has evolved from known examples of malware. I develop a novel extension to graphical
lasso [39] which uses multiple views to find a graph where the nodes are instances of mal-
ware, and the edges correspond to ancestor/descendant relationships between the malware
instances. Graphical lasso starts with the covariance matrices of the data views, which I have
found to be good discriminators, and finds a sparse precision matrix defining the conditional
independencies in the phylogenetic graph of the given malware samples.
2
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1.1 Overview of the Malware Problem
Malicious programs generally try to achieve one of two goals. The first goal is simply to earn
money for the author or sponsoring organization. This can be done by gathering personally
identifiable information (PII) from compromised computers or setting up a botnet to ransom
corporations with the threat of a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) [34]. A second
goal is data exfiltration, which can be motivated either by economic or intelligence reasons.
In either case, there are large incentives for malware authors to continue to develop new
threats.
To detect malicious programs, most corporations and home users make use of some
type of antivirus program. Many of the current antivirus programs rely on a signature-
based approach to classify programs as being either malicious or benign. Signature-based
approaches are popular due to their low false positive rates and low computational complexity
on the end host, both of which are appealing for daily use. Unfortunately, these schemes can
be easily defeated by simple code obfuscation techniques [25, 100]. As polymorphic viruses
became more prevalent, non-signature based methods became more attractive [1, 67, 72].
Furthermore, traditional antivirus has little hope of detecting advanced 0-day malware, as
this malware has not been previously seen in the wild and will therefore lack a signature.
While detection is the first component of malware analysis, it is more informative to ask
several questions that go beyond the simple yes/no answer afforded by a good classification
system:
1. What family does the malware belong to?
2. What functionality does the malware posses?
3. What group can the malware’s creation be attributed to?
These questions become increasingly important in the context of responding to a malware
3
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incident. A reverse engineer is someone who is assigned the task of understanding and
responding to a malware infection, and it is crucial to leverage any previous information
gained from reverse engineering samples from the same family or lineage. This decreases the
reverse engineering time, and allows for a faster response.
1.2 Malware Domain Contributions
There has been a great deal of work applying machine learning techniques to the malware
domain, attempting to solve problems such as classification, clustering, and phylogenetics [11,
45,66]. The main drawback to many of the previous approaches is that they rely on a single
view of the data. Common views of malware data include the disassembled instructions, the
bytes in the binary, and the dynamic instructions gathered while the program is executed.
Malware writers have great incentives to hide malware from regular users as well as reverse
engineers, who are tasked with understanding the malware’s functionality and responding
with appropriate actions (e.g. creating a signature for antivirus software). The longer a new
piece of malware can remain undetected, the more successful it will be.
Because malware can obfuscate itself in many views, in this dissertation I demonstrate a
new multiview paradigm for malware analysis. The central thesis is that although malware
can easily obfuscate itself in one or more views, obfuscating all views while maintaining
malicious intent is significantly more difficult. I extend this multiview paradigm to three
important malware problems: classification, clustering, and phylogenetic reconstruction.
In addition to the multiview paradigm for malware research, an important, pragmatic
contribution of this dissertation is a new malware classifier that is not based on signatures,
but rather fuses several data views using multiple kernel learning to arrive at a more robust
classifier. The views are both static, that is, based on information that does not require the
program to be executed, and dynamic, based on information collected while the program is
running.
4
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1.3 Machine Learning Contributions
The machine learning contributions of this dissertation center around extending the tech-
niques of spectral clustering and graphical lasso (glasso) to incorporate multiple views of
the data without the need for a priori information about the views. These extensions were
motivated by the malware domain, where the importance of individual views is not known
a priori and often changes when presented with a new dataset. However, the method can
easily be applied to any domain where multiple views are available. For instance, multiview
clustering could be used in the context of webpages where multiple views are derived from
the webpage itself and the connections to other webpages [14].
Spectral clustering is a popular method for clustering [74], and I have extended this
framework to naturally incorporate multiple views of data. Spectral clustering revolves
around the following optimization problem:
min
U∈Rn×k
tr(UTLU) (1.1)
s.t. UTU = I
where L is defined to be the Lapacian, L = D − K. K is the adjacency matrix of the
data and D is a diagonal matrix of the degrees of each node in K. I begin by defining the
multiview Laplacian, L(β) =
∑M
i βiDi−
∑M
i βiKi, and extend the optimization framework
of spectral clustering to use the multiview Laplacian:
min
U∈Rn×k
tr(UTL(β)U) (1.2)
s.t. UTU = I
I demonstrate this methodology on both the unnormalized and normalized Laplacians. A
detailed description of this method is described in Chapter 5.
Graphical lasso is an algorithm for finding a sparse inverse covariance matrix [39]. This
inverse covariance matrix, or precision matrix, is a Gaussian graphical model where the
5
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features are nodes and edges represent conditional dependencies [123]. In the work presented
in this dissertation, the nodes are malware samples, and the edges can be thought of as
ancestor/descendant relationships between the samples. Typically, graphical lasso has solved
the following single view problem:
max
Θ
{log(det(Θ))− tr(KΘ)− ||Θ ◦ P ||1} (1.3)
where K is the sample covariance matrix and P provides regularization to the entries in Θ
under the l1 norm. In Chapter 6, I show how to solve the follow multiview glasso problem:
min
Θ,β
{
M∑
i=1
βitr(KiΘ)− log(det(Θ)) + ||Θ ◦ P ||1
}
(1.4)
In this work, I use glasso to infer a phylogenetic graph of a given set of malware samples.
In this context, a phylogenetic graph is a directed acyclic graph, where the node set is the
malware samples and the edges represent evolutionary relationships such as “parent of”.
1.4 Organization of this Dissertation
Chapter 2 reviews the background and related work. Chapter 3 explains the data represen-
tation used to model many of views used throughout this dissertation and gives a case study
of this data representation with respect to the dynamic instruction trace view. In Chapter 4,
I describe the deficiencies of using single views within the context of the malware problem,
and I illustrate the need to incorporate multiple views for improved malware classification.
Chapter 5 demonstrates the multiview framework for the spectral clustering problem and,
Chapter 6 gives the details of the multiview graphical lasso problem. Finally, in Chapter 7,
I conclude and give some directions for future research.
6
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Background and Related Work
This chapter highlights the background and related work that is relevant to this dissertation.
As this dissertation has both security and machine learning facets, this chapter will highlight
relevant related work within both fields. Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, and 2.1.6
deal with security topics. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 highlight machine learning topics.
2.1 Security Background and Related Work
2.1.1 Data Representations
The n-gram representation was one of the earliest used for malware detection, and it has had
great success at detecting obfuscated and polymorphic viruses [31, 48, 61, 66, 89, 90]. Given
some sequence-based data, an n-gram is a contiguous region of length n that is contained
within the sequence. To construct a feature vector using n-grams, first collect all consecutive
token sequences of length n and sort them based on some criteria such as most frequently
occurring n-grams or n-grams with the most information gain [66]. Then initialize the feature
vector of length L with the number of times each of the top-L n-grams occurs in the program.
7
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My method is related to n-grams in the sense that I use 2-grams to condition the transition
probabilities for a Markov chain. The important distinction that my work makes is to use
the transition probabilities instead of the 2-grams as the base data representation and to
define graph kernels on the Markov chains.
The data transformation that I use, program trace to Markov chain, is similar to the
Markov n-gram approach by Shafiq et al. [95,117]. Here, Shafiq et al. perform their analysis
on static files such as MP3s, executable files, and compressed ZIP files and try to find an
discriminative distribution of entropy for non-infected files. They set up a first order Markov
chain between the bytes in their file, and compute the entropy using:
R =
n∑
i=0
piiH(xi) (2.1)
whereH(xi) is the entropy of row i in the transition probability matrix and pi is the stationary
distribution. A histogram is generated from this information and normalized to obtain a
distribution, which approaches the Gaussian distribution as the number of sampled entropies
increases due to the central limit theorem [95]. A threshold of 5 standard deviations from
the mean is used to classify files as containing malware.
Data representations using n-grams are appropriate for sequence-based data, but mal-
ware, and more generally programs, have a very rich structure that cannot always be viewed
as a sequence. For instance, the control flow graph of a program visualizes the code blocks
and the jumps inherent in any non-trivial program. This type of data requires a general
graph data representation [25].
2.1.2 Data Views
A view of malware is a feature set gathered from a specific analysis technique, such as the
instructions taken from the disassembled programs. Malware analysis has been an active
field of research in part due to the wealth of data views that are available to researchers.
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These data views can generally be broken into two categories: static views and dynamic
views. Each category has its own inherent set of strengths and weaknesses and, as I show
later, can be combined to arrive at a superior description of what it means to be malicious.
Static Data Views
Static data views have a number of advantages in terms of computation because there is no
need to devote hardware to run the executable. For this reason, the majority of signature-
based antivirus software in use today uses the static representation. Antivirus software
usually bases its analysis on strings of bytes that are extracted from a repository of malicious
executables. Similarly, machine learning methods have used all of the bytes in the executable
as their data [65, 89, 106]. The main disadvantage to this data view is its vulnerability to
obfuscation techniques such as polymorphism that randomly reorder sections of the code
making analysis of the binary less reliable [67].
The disassembled data has been another popular view in the literature [15, 96]. The
disassembly is produced by programs such as IDA Pro [52] or objdump [82]. Unfortunately,
some malware authors have been able to thwart attempts to disassemble their code by
including encrypted packers [113], limiting the static trace to that of the unpacking code.
When the code can be disassembled, control flow graphs (CFG) can be constructed and
these CFGs have been heavily studied in the literature [21, 25, 41, 67]. CFGs model the
disassembled program as a series of basic blocks with edges that correspond to jumps in the
control flow of the program (by returns, branches, etc.).
Portable Executable (PE) header information has also been used for static malware anal-
ysis [94]. The PE header contains a variety of information including the import address
table, which provides the names of external libraries that the program references. Finally,
statistics on the raw binary, such as size and entropy [75], have been used as static data
views.
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Dynamic Data Views
Dynamic data views have proved to be an invaluable resource to analysts trying to study
encrypted and/or packed instances of malware. Some of the earliest work focused on col-
lecting system calls from the monitored process [48]. In addition to system calls, tools have
been developed that support the collection of assembly instructions that have been executed
[35,73].
Memory taint analysis is the process of checking that values such as jump addresses,
registers, or code supplied input is generated by the correct source and not by a malicious
program [29]. The BitBlaze framework [99] has components to monitor programs to deter-
mine if the integrity of its memory is maintained. Similar to static views, these dynamic
views also have drawbacks. Malware authors have recently begun implementing code to
check if their program is being monitored, and if it is, the program will either start execut-
ing benign instructions or move to a dormant state. These safeguards severely reduce the
effectiveness of dynamic views [64]. Another disadvantage of dynamic data views are that
they require significantly more resources in order to collect the data.
2.1.3 Malware Classification
The best known malware classification schemes are signature-based antivirus programs. To
test whether a program is malicious or not, the antivirus program compares strings of bytes
in its signature database to those found in the tested program, either by exact methods
or approximate string matching [107]. This method is fast and has a low number of false
positives, features that appeal to users. The major drawback to this approach is that it does
not generalize well to malware instances that do not have a signature in its database. And
given that malware authors have access to the antivirus programs, they can adjust how the
polymorphic engines change the code to avoid detection by fuzzy heuristics.
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To meet these challenges, several researchers began to develop less strict measures to
detect malicious code. The general approach taken was to adopt one of the data views
mentioned in the previous section, transform the data into a more convenient form, such as
n-grams, and finally, to apply a common machine learning algorithm (decision trees, support
vector machines, etc.) to that data. These methods saw dramatic improvements over classic
signature-based approaches in terms of classification accuracy, typically as much as 15-20%,
but at the expense of an increased number of false positives [65, 89, 106]. I improve on this
approach by going beyond a single data view. I combine multiple views of the data, each
with their own strengths and weaknesses, into a unified framework, typically gaining an
improvement of 5-10% in classification accuracy.
Another method of malware classification uses deterministic finite automata (DFA) to
create sequential models of system calls [24,54]. The states in the DFA represent the internal
state of the malware at a given time; symbols are the system calls; the transition function
describes the sequence of system calls malware executes; the initial state is the beginning
of the analysis; and the accepting states correspond to a detection of malicious activity
[54]. Although DFAs are a valuable modeling tool in the malware context, I will restrict my
attention in this dissertation to kernel-based methods and not consider them further.
2.1.4 Combining Information
Not all malware classification research has depended only on a single view of the program.
Menahem et al. have combined different features of static files, including byte n-grams and
imported DLLs, to build a series of classifiers based on various machine learning algorithms.
They then use an ensemble learning algorithm to combine the results of the individual learn-
ers. As I will demonstrate, the lack of dynamic information severely hinders this approach.
There has been some research into combining static and dynamic features for the cluster-
ing problem. In [72], Leita et al. use the Anubis framework [4] to capture different aspects
11
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
of malware such as exploits, payloads, and behavioral features to then build different clus-
terings. Then they explore the relationships between the different clusterings. In contrast
to that work, I base my analysis on different classes of data for both the dynamic and static
views. [72] uses 17 static features for the exploit/payload/malware clusters, whereas I com-
pare the Markov chain graphs based on the binary and disassembled information, control
flow graphs, and other file information statistics. The behavioral features of Anubis focus on
modifications to the Windows registry and file system, or interactions with other processes.
My dynamic analysis is based on the Markov chain graphs derived from the dynamic in-
structions and system calls performed. It is important to note that the framework I propose
is general enough to include the data views of [72] once an appropriate kernel is defined.
Finally, I combine the information of the data views using a multiple kernel learning frame-
work to build a single kernel describing the data, whereas the individual clusterings found
in [72] are based solely on their respective data views.
2.1.5 Malware Clustering
There has been a rising interest in learning how to cluster malware so that researchers
can gain insight into the current threat landscape [11, 56, 70, 91]. Because the majority of
new viruses are derived from, or are composites of, established viruses, this information
would enable faster responses and allow researchers to understand the new virus much more
quickly. Much of the work in this field has again been based on a single data view and
has used k-means or hierarchical clustering algorithms. In [11], Bayer et al. use behavioral
characteristics of a program, such as manipulated registry keys or files, to build a feature set
and then use an agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm to produce the clustering.
Karim et al. [56] use n-perms (n-grams without an order restriction) on the binary program
with an agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm. My work differs from the previous
approaches by incorporating multiple data views to learn the clusterings, and using the
Markov chain data representation.
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2.1.6 Malware Phylogenetics
A phylogeny is a graph or tree that demonstrates evolutionary relationships within a popula-
tion. Inferring accurate phylogenies for malware is beginning to be addressed in the research
literature [33, 45, 46, 53, 116]. The ability to understand the lineage of a malware family in
an automated way has several key benefits, the main being that it allows analysts respond
quickly by leveraging information gained from having previously reverse engineered samples
which are similar to the new sample. For example, when a malware analyst receives a new
malware instance, she can save an enormous amount of time in dissecting and identifying it
if a phyolgentic analysis can tell her that its a variant of Bagle [109]. Another important
benefit for the security community is attribution: the ability to attribute the creation of
malware to a known entity.
Within the malware literature, most work has centered around creating phylogenetic
trees. For instance, in [116], Wagener et al. create a similarity matrix based on the system
calls executed by the samples, and then use an agglomerative hierarchical clustering method
to find the phylogenetic tree. Graph-pruning techniques have also been used [45] to find a
tree. Gupta et al. begin with a fully connected similarity graph and incoming edges that are
below a certain threshold are pruned for each node. All the remaining incoming edges are
then pruned if their combined weight is less than a predefined threshold. In [45], malware
similarity is based on text-based features gathered from McAfee’s threat library database.
2.2 Machine Learning Background and Related Work
2.2.1 Multiview Clustering
Multiple kernel learning (MKL) has had a long history with many successful results [9, 62,
101]. The common theme of the majority of the work is that it is based on a modified
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support vector machine with a classification-based objective function. My work deviates
from this trend by finding a linear combination of kernels that explicitly optimizes a spectral
clustering-based objective function. I have empirically shown that the weights resulting from
this framework lead to better clustering results on several benchmark datasets as well as on
a real-world malware dataset compared to state-of-the-art methods [68].
Both the pair-wise and centroid co-regularization schemes [68] I compare against have
similar goals to my method: given multiple data views, find a feature space embedding that
can be used in a clustering algorithm. My method differs in that it does not require a priori
information about which data views are more informative. The pair-wise method finds
multiple embeddings, and although each distinct embedding found contains information
from the other views, one must choose which embedding to base the clustering on. The
centroid method is more similar to my method as it finds a single embedding, but it relies
on an external weight vector whereas my algorithm explicitly solves for the weight vector
describing the importance of each view.
In [126], Zhou and Burges treat each view as a graph and define a random walk with the
graph. They also extend the normalized cut problem of spectral clustering [74] to include
multiple views. They combine the graphs by modifying the random walk to have a small
probability of jumping to a different view. If the stationary probability mass of a subset of
vertices (common among all views) is high, while leaving that subset in any given view is
low, then this subset of vertices is considered a cluster. In their work they used α to denote
the probability of jumping to a different view. This parameter is set before the algorithm
runs by using a uniform distribution. Assuming that some views are more informative than
others, one would want to have the majority of their random walk occur in those views,
and therefore not having a uniform α. α is related to the weight vector I use, except that
my model finds the importance of the different views with respect to a spectral clustering
objective function.
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2.2.2 Multiview Graphical Lasso
While there has not been any work done on a multiview graphical lasso that finds a single
precision matrix, there has been some work that uses transfer learning [32, 44]. In the
problem posed by Danaher et al., the goal is to find several Gaussian graphical models
where the underlying data is drawn from related distributions. The canonical example for
this class of methods is learning gene regulation networks for cancer and normal tissue.
Both types of tissue share many edges in the network so one would want to leverage all
the data possible, but these networks also have significant differences. This goal can be
accomplished by adding an additional L1 penalty to penalize the difference between the two
learned Gaussian graphical models.
The main difference between the fused graphical lasso and my proposed approach is that
I will find a single Gaussian graphical model conditioned on multiple views of the data. The
fused graphical lasso will find multiple Gaussian graphical models, where a hyperparameter
controls the amount of transfer learning between the different models.
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Many current antivirus programs rely on signatures to classify programs as either malicious
or benign. Signature-based approaches are popular due to the belief that they have a low false
positive rate and low computational complexity on the end host, both of which are appealing
for daily usage. Unfortunately, these schemes are easily defeated by simple code obfuscation
techniques and 0-day attacks [25]. With the ease of code obfuscation and polymorphic viruses
becoming more prevalent, other methods are becoming more attractive.
To combat these issues, several researchers began to look at more robust methods to
detect malicious code. These methods generally revolve around n-gram analysis of the static
binary or dynamic trace of the malicious program [31, 89, 90, 105]. These methods have
shown great promise in detecting zero-day malware, but there are drawbacks. The two
parameters generally associated with n-gram models are n, the length of the subsequences
being analyzed, and L, the number of n-grams to analyze. For larger values of n and L,
there is a much more expressive feature space that should be able to discriminate between
malware and benign software more precisely. But with these larger values of n and L, the
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curse of dimensionality is faced: the feature space becomes too large and there is not enough
data to properly learn the model parameters. With smaller values of n and L, the feature
space becomes too small and discriminatory power is lost.
The data representation developed in this chapter avoids the need to specify n and L.
Instead, I model the data as a Markov chain represented by a weighted, directed graph. The
instructions of the program are represented as vertices, and the weights of the edges are the
transition probabilities of the Markov chain, which are estimated using a given data view.
The novel contribution is constructing a similarity, or kernel, matrix between the Markov
chain graphs and using this matrix to perform classification. I use two distinct measures of
similarity to construct the kernel matrix: a local measure comparing corresponding edges
in each graph and a global measure which compares aspects of the graphs’ topologies. This
combination allows me to compare the Markov chain graphs using very different criteria, both
local and global in nature, in a unified framework. Once the kernel matrix is constructed, I
use support vector machines to perform the classification.
This chapter shows that the Markov chain data representation outperforms n-gram and
signature-based methods on the two-class classification problem of malware versus benign
programs. To examine this problem, I use a dataset with 1615 samples of malware and
615 samples of benign software. I also show that the algorithm can correctly discriminate
between instances of the Netbull virus and other families of viruses. For these results, I
use 13 samples of the Netbull virus, each with a different packer, and a random subsample
consisting of 97 samples of unrelated malware. This result helps to validate the use of this
data representation in a malware clustering/phylogenetic setting, as it shows the power of
this method in classifying different examples of viruses.
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mov esi, 0x0040C000
lea edi, [esi-0xB000]
push edi
or ebp, 0xFF
or ebp, 0xFF
jmp 0x00419532
mov ebx, [esi]
mov ebx, [esi]
sub esi, 0xFC
adc ebx, ebx
jc 0x00419528
... ...
push
or
. 2
mov .3
lea
.6
sub
.1 .4
.3
jmp
. 2 5
.1
adc
.6
jc
. 7
. 2
Figure 3.1: The left table shows an example of the trace data collected. A hypothetical
resulting graph representing a fragment of the Markov chain is shown on the right. In a real
Markov chain graph, the probabilities on all of the out-going edges would sum to 1.
3.1 Markov Chains for Malware
As an illustrative example, I focus on the dynamic trace data (collected according to Section
3.4.2), although this representation is suitable for any sequence-based data view. The dy-
namic trace data are the instructions the program executes, typically in a virtual machine to
reduce the risk of contamination. Given an instruction trace P , I am interested in finding a
new representation, P ′, such that I can make unified comparisons in graph space while still
capturing the sequential nature of the data. I achieved this by transforming the dynamic
trace data into a Markov chain which I represent as a weighted, directed graph. A graph,
G = 〈V,E〉, is composed of two sets, V and E. The elements of V are called vertices and the
elements of E are called edges. In this representation, the edge weight, eij, between vertices
i and j corresponds to the transition probability from state i to state j in the Markov chain,
hence, I require the edge weights for edges originating at vi to sum to 1,
∑
i j eij = 1. I use
an n×n (n = |V |) adjacency matrix to represent the graph, where each entry in the matrix,
aij = eij [63].
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The nodes of the graph are the instructions the program executes. To find the edges
of the graph, I first scan the instruction trace, keeping counts for each pair of successive
instructions. After filling in the adjacency matrix with these values, I normalize the matrix
such that all of the non-zero rows sum to one. This process of estimating the transition
probabilities ensures a well-formed Markov chain. Figure 3.1 shows a snippet of trace data
with a resulting fragment of a hypothetical instruction trace graph. The Markov chain graph
can be summarized as G = 〈V,E〉, where
• V is the vertex set composed of unique instructions,
• E is the weighted edge set where the weights correspond to the transition probabilities
and are estimated from the data.
The constructed graphs approximate the pathways of execution of the program, and by
using graph kernels (Section 3.2), the local and global structure of these pathways can be
exploited. Also, unlike n-gram methods where one must choose the top-L n-grams to use,
doing the comparisons in graph space allows my methods to use more of the information
contained in the instruction trace.
I experimented with another method for creating the instruction trace graphs, using a
more expressive vertex set. In this method, I did not discard the arguments to the instruc-
tions but rather constructed vertices in the form 〈operator, operand, operand〉 where the
operator is the instruction, and the operands are either null, or one of three types: reg-
ister, memory, or dereference. This resulted in graphs with vertex sets of roughly 3,000
instructions. I did not use this representation due to poor initial performance with respect
to accuracy and speed. I suspect this performance is a result of there not being enough
trace data to accurately estimate the transition probabilities, similar to using a second-order
Markov chain.
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3.2 Constructing the Similarity Matrix
I use graph kernels [57] to compare the instruction trace graphs. A kernel, K(x,x′), is a gen-
eralized inner product and can be thought of as a measure of similarity between two objects
[92]. The power of kernels lies in their ability to compute the inner product between two
objects in a possibly much higher dimensional feature space, without explicitly constructing
the feature space. A kernel, K : X ×X → R, is defined as:
K(x,x′) = 〈φ(x), φ(x′)〉 (3.1)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the dot product and φ(·) is the projection of the input object into feature
space. A well-defined kernel must satisfy two properties: it must be symmetric (for all x and
y ∈ X: K(x,y) = K(y,x)) and positive-semidefinite (for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and c ∈ Rn:∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 cicjK(xi, xj) ≥ 0). Kernels are appealing in a classification setting due to the
kernel trick [92], which replaces inner products with kernel evaluations. The kernel trick uses
the kernel function to perform a non-linear projection of the data into a higher dimensional
space, where linear classification in this higher dimensional space is equivalent to non-linear
classification in the original input space.
My approach makes use of two types of kernels: a Gaussian kernel and a spectral kernel.
The notions of similarity that these two kernels capture are quite distinct, and I found that
they complement each other very well. The Gaussian kernel is defined by:
KG(x,x
′) = σ2e−
1
2λ2
∑
i,j(xij−x′ij)2 (3.2)
where x and x′ are the weighted adjacency matrices of the Markov chains with the weights
being the transition probabilities, σ and λ are the hyperparameters of the kernel function
(determined through cross-validation), and
∑
i,j sums the squared distance between corre-
sponding edges in the weighted adjacency matrices. This kernel searches for local similarities
between the adjacency matrices. The motivation behind this kernel is that two different
classes of programs should have different pathways of execution, which would result in a low
similarity score.
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Figure 3.2: The eigenstructure of the Markov chain graph from two program traces. An
example of benign software is shown in (a) and an example of malware is shown in (b).
I also use a kernel based on spectral techniques [26]. These methods use the eigenvectors
of the graph Laplacian to infer global properties about the graph. The weighted graph
Laplacian is a |V | × |V | matrix defined as:
L =

1− evv
dv
if u = v, and dv 6= 0,
− euv√
dudv
if u and v are adjacent,
0 otherwise.
(3.3)
where euv is the weight between vertices u and v, and dv is the degree of v. I take the
eigenvectors associated with non-zero eigenvalues of L, φ(L), as the new set of features. These
eigenvectors encode global information about the graph’s smoothness, diameter, number of
components and stationary distribution among other things. With this information, the
second kernel is constructed by using a Gaussian kernel on the eigenvectors:
KS(x,x
′) = σ2e−
1
2λ2
∑
k ||φk(L(x))−φk(L(x′))||2 (3.4)
where φk(L(x)) and φk(L(x′)) are the eigenvectors associated with the weighted Laplacian
of the adjacency matrices, L(x) and L(x′).
To give some intuition behind the spectral kernel, Figure 3.2 plots the eigenvectors of
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the graph Laplacian for an example of benign software and an example of malware. The
diagonal ridge in each figure represents all of the unused instructions in the trace, which are
disconnected components in the graph. To construct KS, only the top-k eigenvectors are
used and this ridge information is discarded. The decision to use only the top-k eigenvectors
is defended in Section 3.4.4. The interesting information of the graph, the actual program
flow contained in the largest connected component, is found in the spikes and valleys at the
bottom of Figures 3.2a and 3.2b. The eigenvectors of the Laplacian can be thought of as
a Fourier basis for the graph [26]. Comparing these harmonic oscillations, encoded by the
eigenvectors, between different types of software provides discrimination between structural
features of the graph such as strongly connected components and cycles.
3.2.1 Algebra on Kernels
If two kernels, K1 and K2, are valid, then K = K1+K2 is also a valid kernel [16]. This algebra
on kernels allows for the elegant combination of kernels that measure different aspects of the
input data, and it is the object of study in multiple kernel learning [9,101]. The final kernel
is a weighted combination of KG and KS:
KC = µKG + (1− µ)KS (3.5)
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. A convex combination of kernels, where µi ≥ 0 and
∑
i µi = 1 for
some weight vector µ, also forms a valid kernel. Within the context of this chapter, µ is
found using a cross-validation search where the candidate µ’s are restricted to be in the
range [.05, .95] with a step size of .05. Although more advanced techniques to search for
the parameters of multiple kernel learning exist [101], I found this simple approach to be
sufficient for the combination of these two kernels. With more than two kernels, grid search
becomes significantly more complex making other alternatives more efficient.
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3.3 Classifying Malware
I use support vector machines [22] to perform the classification. Support vector machines
search for a hyperplane in the feature space that separates the points of the two classes with
a maximal margin [22]. The hyperplane that is found by the SVM is a linear combination
of the data instances, xi, with weights, αi. It is important to note that only points close to
the hyperplane will have non-zero α’s. These points are called support vectors. Therefore,
the goal in learning SVMs is to find the weight vector, α, describing each data instance’s
contribution to the hyperplane. Using quadratic programming, the following optimization
problem can be efficiently solved:
max
α
(
n∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αiαjyiyj〈xi,xj〉
)
(3.6)
subject to the constraints:
n∑
i=1
αiyi = 0 (3.7)
0 ≤ αi ≤ C (3.8)
In Equation 3.6, yi is the class label of instance xi, and 〈·, ·〉 is the Euclidean dot product.
Equation 3.7 constrains the hyperplane to go through the origin. Equation 3.8 constrains the
α’s to be non-negative and less than some constant C. C allows for soft-margins, meaning
that some of the examples may fall between the margins. This helps prevent over-fitting
the training data and allows for better generalization accuracy. The weight vector for the
hyperplane is then defined to be:
w =
∑
i
αiyixi (3.9)
With this current setup, only linear hyperplanes are possible in the d-dimensional space
defined by the feature vectors of x. By using the kernel trick, the data instances can be
projected into a higher dimensional space and a linear hyperplane can be found in that
23
Chapter 3. The Markov Chain Data Representation
space, which would be equivalent to a non-linear hyperplane in the original d-dimensional
space. The new optimization problem is:
max
α
(
n∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αiαjyiyjk(xi,xj)
)
(3.10)
Equation 3.6 and Equation 3.10 are identical with the exception that the dot product, 〈·, ·〉,
has been replaced with the kernel function k(·, ·).
Given α found in Equation 3.10, the decision function is defined as:
f(x) = sgn
(
n∑
i
αiyik(x,xi)
)
(3.11)
which returns class +1 if the summation is ≥ 0, and class -1 if the summation is < 0. The
number of kernel computations in Equation 3.11 is decreased because many of the α’s are
zero.
3.4 Experimental Setup
3.4.1 Data/Environment
To perform the experiments, I used a machine with quad Xeon X5570s running at 2.93GHz
with 24GB of memory. The dataset is composed of two distinct groups which is used to
answer two main questions:
1. What is the false and true positive performance when classifying benign versus malware
samples?
2. Can the proposed method discriminate the Netbull virus, with different packers, from
other malware samples?
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To answer the first question, I collected 1615 instances of malware and 615 instances of
benign software, as described in Section 3.4.2. To answer the second question, I used 13
instances of the Netbull virus with different packers, such as UPX [113] and ASprotect [5],
and compared against a random subsample of 97 instances of malware.
3.4.2 Data Collection
The data collection technique uses the Ether analysis framework [35] to extract data from a
Windows XP system. The Ether system was chosen as it guarantees some level of protection
against hardware based virtual machine detection. The main protection mechanisms that
need to be overcome are debugger and virtual machine detection, timing attacks, and host
system modifications. Each of these violate the fundamental tenet that the analyzed system
must not be altered in any manner. The end result of instruction tracing is a list of the
in-order executed instructions. These instructions provide the input to the algorithm.
To analyze the data, I begin by copying the executable to the Ether analysis system.
Then an instantiation of a Windows virtual machine is started, and after successful boot,
the file is copied onto the virtual machine. Then, the Ether portion of Xen is invoked and the
malware is started. The sample is allowed to run for five minutes, which has been shown to
be sufficient [87]. It should be noted that the 5-minute heuristic does not take into account
execution-stalling malware. With as much as 33% of malware exhibiting execution-stalling
behavior [64], dynamic analysis by itself is not sufficient. This will be addressed in Chapter
4.
I found 160 unique instructions across all of the dynamic traces collected. These instruc-
tions are the vertices of the Markov chains. The representation ignores operands used with
the 160 instructions. By ignoring operands, I remove sensitivity to register allocation and
other compiler artifacts. It is important to note that rarely did the instruction traces make
use of all 160 unique instructions, and therefore, the adjacency matrices of the instruction
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trace graphs contain some rows of zeros. The decision to incorporate unused instructions in
the model allowed for a consistent vertex set between all instruction trace graphs, and thus
allowing for uniform comparisons in graph space.
3.4.3 Other Methods
To determine the validity of the Markov chain data representation, I compared it to a
standard n-gram model [66] and 9 leading antivirus software programs that use signature-
based methods. For the standard n-gram model, I chose the top-L n-grams to use by
computing the information gain as suggested in [66]:
IG(j) =
∑
vj∈{0,1}
∑
yi∈Y
Pˆ (vj, yi) log
Pˆ (vj, yi)
Pˆ (vj)Pˆ (yi)
(3.12)
where vj represents whether the jth n-gram exists or not, Pˆ (vj, yi) is the percentage of
data instances with class label yi and value vj, Pˆ (vj) is the percentage of instances with
value vj, and Pˆ (yi) is the percentage of instances with class label yi. The intuition with the
information gain criteria is that one should choose n-grams that are either highly correlated
with the malware class or the benign class, but not both. Once the list of n-grams is sorted
based on their information gain, the top-L are selected to train the classification algorithm.
It is important to note that I used n-grams derived from the same dynamic traces on which
the Markov chain representations were based and not on static information contained in the
binary.
To find the best choices for the parameters n and L for the standard n-gram model,
I varied n from 2 to 6 and L from 500 to 3,000 in increments of 500. For each choice of
parameters, I ran both a support vector machine, with a linear kernel, Gaussian kernel, and
d-order polynomial (2 ≤ d ≤ 9) kernel, and a k-nearest neighbor classifier (1 ≤ k ≤ 9), with
the feature vector consisting of the top-L n-grams. I present the top-5 performing parameter
combinations for the n-gram model.
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Figure 3.3: Classification accuracy of 50 instances of malware versus 10 instances of benign
software as the number of eigenvectors are varied, k, of the spectral kernel. Results are
averaged over 10 runs with the error bars being one standard deviation.
I also present the top-5 performing antivirus programs in the results. These are BitDe-
fender [18], Kaspersky [58], Avira [8], F-Secure [40], and F-prot [37]. These results were
gathered in September, 2010 with the currently up-to-date signature databases.
3.4.4 Selecting the k eigenvectors
To find the appropriate k, the number of eigenvectors used to classify the program traces
in Equation 3.4, I performed a series of tests on an independent dataset of 50 malware
program traces and 10 benign traces where I adjusted k using values ranging from 1 to 30.
To reduce computation, I choose the smallest possible k that still maintains discriminatory
power relative to classification accuracy.
Figure 3.3 shows the results of choosing k averaged over 10 runs with the error bars
showing one standard deviation. The decreasing performance as k is increased is expected
because as more eigenvectors are chosen, the feature space begins to overfit the training
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Method Accuracy (%) FPs FNs AUC
Gaussian Kernel 95.70% 44 52 .9845
Spectral Kernel 90.99% 80 121 .9524
Combined Kernel 96.41% 47 33 .9874
n-gram (n=3, L=2500, SVM=3-poly) 82.15% 300 98 .9212
n-gram (n=4, L=2000, SVM=3-poly) 81.17% 327 93 .9018
n-gram (n=2, L=1000, 4-NN) 80.63% 325 107 .8922
n-gram (n=2, L=1500, SVM=2-poly) 79.82% 339 111 .8889
n-gram (n=4, L=1500, SVM=Gauss) 79.42% 354 105 .8991
BitDefender 73.32% 0 595 N/A
Kaspersky 53.86% 1 1028 N/A
Avira 49.60% 0 1196 N/A
F-Secure 43.27% 1 1264 N/A
F-Prot 42.96% 1 1271 N/A
Table 3.1: The classification accuracy of 615 instances of benign software versus 1615 in-
stances of malware. Best performing method is bolded. The top 5 parameter choices for
the n-gram model are presented as well as the top-5 performing signature-based antivirus
programs. FP = false positive, FN = false negative, AUC = area under the ROC curve,
Accuracy = TP+TN/(# of samples)
data, which results in lower accuracy on the test set. Given these results, I set k = 9 to
maximize classification accuracy for the next experiments. Alternatively, k could be selected
using cross-validation on a validation dataset for each experiment.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Benign versus Malware
I now explore the validity of the multiple kernel learning method as an alternative to n-
gram and signature-based virus detection methods. Table 3.1 presents the results of the
three different kernels and the n-gram methods using 10-fold cross-validation. The top-
5 performing antivirus programs are also presented. For the n-gram methods, I used the
28
Chapter 3. The Markov Chain Data Representation
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
(a) Gaussian Kernel
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
(b) Spectral Kernel
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
(c) Combined Kernel
Figure 3.4: The heat maps of the kernel (similarity) matrix for benign software versus
malware. Benign programs are the first 19 instances in the top left. Warmer colors represent
higher measures of similarity. The smaller block in the upper left of each figure is the benign
software and the larger lower right is the malware. The axes are the indices of the samples.
same parameters as discussed in the previous section. The best results with respect to
overall accuracy for the n-grams were achieved when n = 4, L = 1000 and a support vector
machine with a second order polynomial kernel was used. It is interesting that three antivirus
programs, as well as the methods based on the Markov chain data representation, labeled
the same benign executable as being malicious. This could be a result of a noisy dataset or
a bad signature.
Both machine learning approaches, graph kernels and n-grams, were able to easily out-
perform the standard antivirus programs with respect to overall accuracy. However, it should
be noted that antivirus programs operate under the assumption of a “wild list” [28], meaning
that the signature database will only contain signatures that the antivirus company believes
to be currently propagating in the wild. The malware that was tested was collected over a
6 month period 6 months prior to the results presented in Table 3.1. It is very possible that
these antivirus programs had signatures of a larger percentage of the data, and then pruned
these signatures as they were no longer circulating in the wild.
Despite n-grams outperforming the antivirus programs, the Markov chain data represen-
tation still provided a significant improvement over n-gram methods. These results reinforce
the hypothesis that learning with the Markov chain graphs improves accuracy. Table 3.1 also
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Method Accuracy (%) FPs FNs AUC
Gaussian Kernel 99.09% 1 0 .9965
Spectral Kernel 96.36% 4 0 .9344
Combined Kernel 100.00% 0 0 1.00
n-gram (n=4, L=1000, SVM=2-poly) 94.55% 5 1 .8776
n-gram (n=4, L=2500, SVM=Gauss) 93.64% 6 1 .8215
n-gram (n=6, L=2500, SVM=2-poly) 92.73% 6 2 .8432
n-gram (n=3, L=1000, SVM=2-poly) 89.09% 12 0 .6173
n-gram (n=2, L=500, 3-NN) 88.18% 12 1 .6334
Table 3.2: The classification accuracy of 13 instances of the Netbull virus with different
packers versus 97 instances of malware. Best performing method is bolded.
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Figure 3.5: The heat maps of the kernel matrix for the Netbull virus with different packers
versus malware. Netbull are the first 13 instances in the top left.
illustrates that a combined kernel, which uses the local and global structural information
about the Markov chain graph as discussed in Section 3.2, improves performance over the
standalone kernels.
Figure 3.4 shows the heat maps (the values for the similarity matrix) for the 3 kernels
I tested against. For visual purposes, I only show kernel values for 19 benign samples and
97 malware samples. The program traces that are more similar will have warmer colors.
The block structure seen in this figure indicates that these kernels are able to discriminate
between the two classes of software.
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With the current dataset, I have more examples of malware than I do benign software.
This is a by-product of the availability of the benign trace data. This data skew might
contribute to the false-positives found in both my method and the n-gram methods. In a
production setting, a more diverse and extensive set of benign trace data would be needed
to alleviate this problem.
3.5.2 Netbull versus Malware
The second set of experiments evaluates the performance of these algorithms with respect
to their ability to differentiate between different types of malware. This is an important
question as I will use this methodology in a clustering/phylogenetics setting in later chapters.
This dataset was composed of 13 instances of the Netbull virus with different packers and
a random subsample of 97 instances of malicious code from the main malware dataset. I
limited the number of other families of viruses to 97 due to the effects of data skew. The
results are summarized in Table 3.2.
These results are promising because the method using the combined kernel can correctly
classify all instances of the Netbull virus despite this being a very skewed dataset. The
n-gram methods were less successful on this task. After the top-3 parameter choices for the
n-grams, these models quickly devolved into predicting the majority class for all instances.
This is a known problem in machine learning algorithms [23].
The kernels for this dataset are displayed in Figure 3.5 and have a similar block structure
to Figure 3.4. This is important because it validates the approach’s ability to distinguish
between somewhat similar pieces of malware. These results also validate my choice of data
representation and associated kernels in a kernel-based clustering environment [74].
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Component Time
Gaussian Kernel 147.91 ± 9.54
Spectral Kernel 550.55 ± 32.90
SVM Optimization 0.16 ± 0.05
Classifying New Instance 0.54 ± 0.07
Total Offline 698.45 ± 57.44
Total Online 0.54 ± 0.07
Table 3.3: Timing results for the computation time for each step of the method. All results
are in seconds with one standard deviation given.
3.5.3 Timing Results
In this section I explore the computation time for the proposed method. As stated previ-
ously, there are two main components to this approach; computing the graph kernels and
performing the support vector machine optimization (Equations 3.5 and 3.10), which can be
done offline, and the classification of a new instance (Equation 3.11), which is done online.
I used the dataset composed of 1,615 samples of malicious programs and 615 samples of
benign programs.
As Table 3.3 illustrates, the majority of the method’s time is spent computing the kernel
matrices. It took 698.45 seconds to compute the full kernel matrices. However, this com-
putation can be performed offline once, so it will not slow down a production system. The
online component of classifying a new instance took 0.54 seconds as shown in Table 3.3. The
majority of this time is spent computing the kernel values between the new instance and the
labeled training data as described in Equation 3.11.
The number of kernel computations is decreased due to the support vector machine
finding a sparse set of support vectors. The PyML implementation of the SVM typically
found ∼350 support vectors. There are other forms of support vector machines [55] that
search for sparser solutions, which would speed up this online component by reducing the
number of support vectors, and thus the number of kernel computations. The complexity
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analysis in included in Appendix C.1.
3.6 Conclusion
With the advent of polymorphic code and obfuscated viruses, signature-based malware de-
tection is becoming outdated [25]. To combat this, many researchers have began drawing
ideas from machine learning to create more flexible detection algorithms. Many of these
approaches have centered around using n-gram based statistics to classify new instances as
being either benign or malware.
The Markov chain data representation presented in this chapter extends the n-gram
methodology by using 2-grams to condition the transition probabilities of a Markov chain,
and then treats that Markov chain as a graph. Treating the Markov chain as a graph allows
the use of graph kernels to construct a similarity matrix between instances in the training
set. I use two distinct measures of similarity to construct the kernel matrix: a Gaussian
kernel, which measures local similarity between the graphs’ edges, and a spectral kernel,
which measures global similarity between the graphs. Given the kernel matrix, I can then
train a support vector machine to perform classification on unlabeled samples.
I demonstrated the performance of the Markov chain data representation on two prob-
lems. The first investigated whether the method could properly discriminate between in-
stances of malware and benign software. I showed that with the combined kernel my method
was able to outperform n-gram and signature-based methods, while maintaining a low false
positive rate. The second problem tested whether the method could discriminate between
different types of malware. I compared the Netbull virus with different packers to a set
of other instances of malware. The method was able to perfectly classify these instances.
This result is promising for using these kernels in a clustering setting, which would allow
researchers to more quickly understand the dynamics of a new virus.
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Malware Classification: Bridging the
Static/Dynamic Gap
While classifying malicious programs based on dynamic instruction traces has shown great
promise, there are several limitations to relying on a single view of the data. As I will
mention in Section 4.1.2, the collection of dynamic information can be detected by the
malicious program. When a sufficiently sophisticated malicious program has detected that
it is being traced or being run in a virtual machine, it will then either stall its execution or
perform benign activities, causing a great deal of confusion for the reverse engineer in charge
of the analysis. In this case, the reverse engineer would fall back to purely static techniques.
The novel contribution of this chapter is to show how to combine different data views
using multiple kernel learning [101] to arrive at a new classification system that integrates
all of the available information about a program into a unified framework [2]. The key
insight of my approach is that each data view provides complementary information about
the true nature of a program, but no one view contains all of this information. I aim
to construct a classification system that contains all aspects of a program’s true intended
behavior. I begin by defining a kernel, a positive semi-definite matrix where each entry in
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the matrix is a measure of similarity between a pair of instances in the dataset, for each data
view. I then use multiple kernel learning [9, 101] to find the weights of each kernel, create a
linear combination of the kernels, and finally use a support vector machine [22] to perform
classification.
This framework is particularly appealing for three reasons. First, it combines both static
and dynamic features in a way that allows the learning algorithm to take advantage of both
simultaneously. Second, it is extendable in the sense that future data views could be easily
added to the model without complicating the final result. Finally, the method presented in
this chapter is highly parallelizable: computing the kernel values for testing new malware can
be carried out in parallel, the implication being that larger datasets can easily be handled.
I present my results on a dataset composed of 776 benign programs and 780 malicious
programs. In addition to this dataset, I test the methods on a separate validation dataset
composed of 20,936 malicious samples. For each program I collect six data views: the static
binary, the disassembled binary file, the control flow graph from the disassembled binary
file, a dynamic instruction trace, a dynamic system call trace, and a file information feature
vector composed of information gathered from all of the previous data views. For the binary
file, disassembled file, and two dynamic traces, I build kernels based on the Markov chain
graphs; for the control flow graph, I use a graphlet kernel [97]; and for the file information
feature vector, I use a standard Gaussian kernel as explained in Section 4.1.2.
I show that integrating multiple data views increases overall classification performance
with regard to accuracy, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, and area under the
ROC curve (AUC). I also provide results examining the efficacy of each individual data view
with regard to different metrics, including the time from receiving the sample to making
a classification decision. I report kernel combinations (in addition to the combination of
all six data views) which can achieve reasonably high performance if time and computing
resources are at a premium. I also demonstrate some of the pitfalls of the dynamic and static
methodologies, such as, static data views struggling with packed instances. Instances whose
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entropies deviated from the mean also caused problems, where in the dataset used the mean
of malware was 7.52 and the mean of benign was 6.34,
4.1 The Deficiencies of Individual Views for the Mal-
ware Problem
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, malware authors have developed methods
to obfuscate their malware. The typical story is a back-and-forth between malware authors
and malware analysts: the analysts find a new way to detect malware, and the malware
authors respond by creating protection mechanisms to avoid this detection. In the following
sections, I give some example. The two main classes of data used by analysts are static,
data that does not require the program to be executed, and dynamic, data that needs to be
executed (in most cases in a virtual machine to reduce the chance of contamination). There
have been many protections put in place to hinder analysis in both of these views, making
either unreliable by itself.
4.1.1 Static Data Views
Encrypted malware was one of the first techniques employed by malware authors [121].
This was originally used to avoid signature detection by generating different encryption keys
when the malware was copied, thus creating unique binaries at each step of the infection.
Encrypted malware cannot be easily reverse engineered, making many static views unreliable.
For instance, disassembling the code would result in the disassembly of the decrypting code,
but not the actual malicious code.
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4.1.2 Dynamic Data Views
Once reverse engineers realized that static views of the code could be easily compromised,
they turned their attention to dynamic analysis. For safety reasons, during analysis malicious
code is normally run in a virtual machine behind a firewall to prevent further propagation.
Malware authors responded to these methods by developing execution-stalling techniques
[64]. Execution-stalling prevents the malware from running for some prescribed amount of
time, assuming that the reverse engineers will give up after some relatively short period of
time. A slightly more advanced method of execution-stalling looks at where the malware is
being run, halting if it detects it is being run from a virtual machine with the assumption
being that only malware analysts would run programs within a virtual machine. This type
of defense may become less common as virtual machines become more prevalent.
4.2 Integrating Multiple Views for Improved Perfor-
mance
In this section, I highlight the six data views I have chosen to use in my model. It is important
to note that while these views have all been well-studied in the literature [1, 15, 48, 65, 67],
they are by no means a complete survey of the literature. The methods reviewed in Section
4.2.2 can be easily extended to take advantage of any additional views that an analyst has
at his or her disposal.
4.2.1 Data Views
I aim to cover some of the most popular data views that have been used for malware classifi-
cation in the literature. These data views also try to capture many of the different views of a
program in the hopes that, while a malicious executable can disguise itself in some views, dis-
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guising itself in every view while maintaining malicious intent will prove to be substantially
more difficult. I use three static data views: the binary file, the disassembled binary, and the
control flow graph of the disassembled binary. I use two dynamic data views: the dynamic
instruction trace and the dynamic system call trace. Finally, I use a file information data
view, which contains seven statistics that provide a summary of the previous data views.
Binary. I use the raw byte information contained in the binary executable to construct my
first data view. There is a long history of using this type of data to classify malware [65,106].
Generally, the bytes are used in an n-gram framework to construct a feature vector that is
then given to some machine learning classification algorithm (i.e. boosted decision trees [65]).
In contrast to these methods, I use 2-grams to condition a Markov chain and then perform
classification in graph space as explained in Section 4.2.2. In the Markov chain, the byte
values (0-255) correspond to different vertices in the graph, and the transition probabilities
are estimated by the frequencies of the 2-grams.
Disassembled. The opcodes of the disassembled program have also been used to generate
malware detection schemes [15, 96]. To generate the disassembled code, I use IDA Pro [52].
Once I have the disassembled code, I build a Markov chain similar to the way the Markov
chain for the binary files was built. Instead of the byte values being the vertices in the
graph, I use the disassembled instructions for the vertices in the graph. Unfortunately, the
number of unique instructions found in the disassembled files (∼1200) resulted in very large
Markov chains that overfitted the data resulting in poor initial performance. This is in part
due to the curse of dimensionality [16]: the feature space becomes too large and there is
not enough data to properly learn the model parameters. Furthermore, some instructions
perform identical or very similar tasks, resulting in many transitions that are identical yet
treated as distinct. To combat this, I used several categorizations, each with increasing
complexity. The coarsest categorization contained eight categories (math, logic, privileged,
branch, memory, stack, nop, and other). The other categorizations had 34, 68, 77, 86, 154,
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Figure 4.1: An example of a control flow graph demonstrating jumps.
and 172 categories. I found the categorization with 86 categories to perform the best. This
categorization had separate categories for most of the initial 8086/8088 instructions as well
as categories for some extended instruction sets such as SSE and MMX. Further research
into an optimal categorization that better represents program behavior is currently being
considered and is discussed in Section 7.2.
Control Flow Graph. The use of control flow graphs has become a popular means to
perform malware classification [25, 67]. A control flow graph is a graph representation that
models all of the paths of execution that a program might take during its lifetime (Figure
4.1). In the graph, the vertices are the basic blocks, sequential code without branches or
jump targets, of the program, and the edges represent the jumps in control flow of the
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program. One of the advantages of this representation is that it has been shown to be
very difficult for a polymorphic virus to create a semantically similar version of itself while
modifying its control flow graph enough to avoid detection [67]. To compute the similarity
between different control flow graphs, I use a simplified kernel based on previous work in the
literature [67]. This kernel works by counting similarly shaped subgraphs of a certain size,
and is explained in detail in Section 4.2.2.
Dynamic Instruction Traces. Due to the limits of static analysis discussed in Section
4.1.1, I chose to include two dynamic data views, the instruction traces and the system call
traces collected over a five minute run using the KVM virtual machine [69] and the Intel Pin
program [73]. Dynamic instructions traces are known to produce highly accurate malware
classification results [1,31]. Similar to the disassembled data, I used the same categorization
of 86 categories and constructed the Markov chain in the same manner.
Dynamic System Call Traces. System call traces have been another popular dynamic
data view [12, 48, 93]. Over the 1556 traces, I recorded 2460 unique system calls. I used
the Markov chain graph representation, and like the disassembled instruction set, found
that treating each unique system call as a vertex in the Markov chain led to poor initial
performance. I therefore grouped the system calls into 94 categories where each category
represents semantically similar groups of system calls, such as painting to the screen, writing
to files, or cryptographic functions.
Miscellaneous File Information. For this data view, I collected seven pieces of informa-
tion about the various data views described previously. This data is summarized in Table
4.1. I look at the entropy and the size of the binary file. Similar to previous work on entropy
[75, 95], I found the average entropy of the benign files in the dataset to be 6.34 and the
average entropy of the malicious files in the dataset to be 7.52. I also have a binary feature
to look at whether the binary executable has a recognizable packer such as UPX [113] or
Armadillo [112]. To find whether a file was packed or not, I used the PEID signature method
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Statistic Malware Benign
Entropy 7.52 6.34
Binary Size 0.799 2.678
Packed 47.56% 19.59%
Num Vertices (CFG) 5,829.69 10,938.85
Num Edges (CFG) 7,189.58 13,929.40
Num Static Instrs 50,982 72,845
Num Dynamic Instrs 7,814,452 2,936,335
Table 4.1: Summary of the file information statistics used: the average entropy, average
size of the binary (in megabytes), average number of vertices and edges in the control flow
graph, the average number of instructions in the disassembled files, and the average number
of instructions/system calls in the dynamic traces. The percentage of files known to packed
is also given.
[86]. For the disassembled binary feature, I took the number of instructions found in the
disassembled file. I also use the number of edges and the number of vertices in the control
flow graph. Finally, I took the sum of the number of dynamic instructions and dynamic
system calls as the last feature.
4.2.2 Multiple Kernel Learning
In this section, I first describe how I transform the six data views of Section 4.2.1 into more
convenient representations. I then show how it is possible to define kernels, or similarity
measures, that are able to accurately compare these data views in their new representations.
Finally, I describe a method of multiple kernel learning that finds a linear combination of
these kernels which can then be used in a support vector machine setting.
Data Representations. The six canonical data views described in Section 4.2.1 can be
grouped into three sets. The miscellaneous file information that I collect can be represented
as a simple feature vector of length seven where each of the seven statistics corresponds to
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mov esi, 0x0040C000
lea edi, [esi-0xB000]
push edi
or ebp, 0xFF
or ebp, 0xFF
jmp 0x00419532
mov ebx, [esi]
mov ebx, [esi]
sub esi, 0xFC
adc ebx, ebx
jc 0x00419528
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Figure 4.2: The left table shows an example of the trace data collected. A hypothetical
graph representing a fragment of the Markov chain derived from the trace is shown on the
right. In a real Markov chain graph, all of the out-going edges would sum to 1.
a feature. The control flow graphs are represented in the same way as the standard in the
literature [25, 67], where the basic blocks are nodes in a graph and directed edges represent
the control flow between different blocks. For the third set, the raw binary, disassembled
binary, dynamic instruction trace, and dynamic system call trace, I use the Markov chain
representation described in Chapter 3 and illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Kernels.
As described in Section 3.1, a kernel, K(x,x′), is a generalized inner product and can
be thought of as a measure of similarity between two objects [92]. For the Markov chain
representations and the file information feature vector, I use a standard squared exponential
kernel:
KSE(x,x
′) = σ2e−
1
2λ2
∑
i(xi−x′i)2 (4.1)
where xi represents one of the seven features for the file information data view, or a transition
probability for the Markov chain representations. σ and λ are the hyperparameters of the
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(a) Binary SE
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(b) File Info SE
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(c) CFG 4-graphlet
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(d) Dynamic Instruction SE
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(e) Static Instruction SE
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(f) System Call SE
Figure 4.3: Heatmaps for the six individual kernels. The first 780 samples (the top left block
in the heatmaps) are the malware samples and the second 776 samples (the bottom right
block) are the benign samples. The off diagonal blocks are the similarities between malware
and benign samples.
kernel function (estimated through cross-validation), and
∑
i,j sums the squared distance
between the corresponding features.
For the control flow graph data view, I attempted to find a kernel that closely matched
previous work in the literature [67]. Although the approach I chose does not take the
instruction information of the basic blocks into account, I selected the graphlet kernel due
to its computational efficiency [97]. A k-graphlet is defined as a subgraph, of a graph G,
with the number of nodes of the subgraph equal to k. If ~fG is a a feature vector, where
each feature is the number of times a unique graphlet of size k occurs in G, the normalized
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Figure 4.4: Heatmap for all six kernels combined with the weights found using multiple
kernel learning.
probability vector is:
~DG =
~fG
# of all graphlets of size k in G
(4.2)
and the graphlet kernel is defined as:
Kg(G,G
′) = ~DTG ~DG′ (4.3)
I experimented with graphlets of size k ∈ {3, 4, 5} and found k = 4 to be optimal with
respect to both classification accuracy and AUC.
Figure 4.3 shows the heatmaps for the six individual kernels and Figure 4.4 shows the
heatmap of the combined kernel with the weights of the individual kernels being found using
multiple kernel learning (see Equation 4.8). The block structure observed in these figures is
interesting because it shows that the kernels and data views I selected are able to discriminate
between malware and benign samples. This is apparent in Figure 4.4 where the top left block
(the similarity between the malware samples) has very high values compared with the rest
of the image.
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A set of M valid kernels, K1, K2, . . ., KM , and some vector β where βi ≥ 0 ∀i and∑
i βi = 1, can be combined into a valid kernel Kcomb [16],
Kcomb =
M∑
1≤i≤M
βiKi (4.4)
This algebra on kernels allows us to combine kernels that measure very different aspects
of the input data, or even different views of the data, and it is studied by multiple kernel
learning [9, 101].
Multiple Kernel Learning. The goal of classical kernel-based learning with support vector
machines is to learn the weight vector, α, describing each data instance’s contribution to the
hyperplane that separates the points of the two classes with a maximal margin [22] and can
be found with the following optimization problem:
min
α
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αiαjyiyjK(xi,xj)−
n∑
i=1
αi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sk(α)
(4.5)
subject to the constraints:
n∑
i=1
αiyi = 0 (4.6)
0 ≤ αi ≤ C
where yi is the class label of instance xi. Equation 4.6 constrains the α’s to be non-negative
and less than some constant C. C allows for soft-margins, meaning that some of the examples
may fall between the margins. This helps prevent over-fitting the training data and allows
for better generalization accuracy [22].
With multiple kernel learning, each individual kernel’s contribution, β, must also be
found such that:
Kcomb(xi,xj) =
M∑
k=1
βkKk(xi,xj) (4.7)
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is a convex combination of M kernels with βk ≥ 0, where each kernel, Kk, uses a distinct set
of features [101]. In the current case, each distinct set of features is a different view of the
data (Section 4.2.1). The general outline of the algorithm is to first combine the kernels with
βk = 1/M , find α, and then iteratively continue optimizing for β and α until convergence.
Complexity analysis is given in Appendix C.2.
To solve for β, assuming a fixed set of support vectors (α), the following semi-infinite
linear program has been proposed [101]:
max θ (4.8)
w.r.t. θ ∈ R, β ∈ RK
subject to the constraints:
0 ≤ β (4.9)
∑
k
βk = 1
M∑
k=1
βkSk(α) ≥ θ
for all α ∈ RN with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1C and ∑i yiαi = 0, and where Sk(α) is defined in Equation
4.5. M is the number of kernels to be combined. This is a semi-infinite linear program
because all of the constraints in Equation 4.9 are linear, and there are infinitely many of
them, one for each α ∈ RN satisfying 0 ≤ α ≤ 1C and ∑i yiαi = 0 [47]. θ cannot go to
∞ because of the constraint ∑Mk=1 βkSk(α) ≥ θ. Finding the maximal theta corresponds to
finding a saddle-point of the following min-max optimization problem:
max
β
min
α
M∑
k=1
βkSk(α) (4.10)
If α is the optimal solution, then θ =
∑M
k=1 βkSk(α) would be minimal satisfying Equation
4.9 for all α. More details on θ can be found in [103].
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Figure 4.5: Architecture diagram for the MKL algorithm.
To find solutions for α and β, an iterative algorithm was proposed that first uses a
standard support vector machine algorithm to find α (Equation 4.5), then fixes α to the
solution, and solves Equation 4.8 to find β. Although this algorithm is known to converge,
there are no known convergence rates [47]. Therefore, the following stopping criterion was
proposed [101]:
t+1 ≥ t :=
∣∣∣∣∣1−
∑M
k=1 β
t
kSk(α
t)
θt
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.11)
This method of multiple kernel learning has been found to be very efficient. Solving for
α and β with as many as one million examples and twenty kernels has been shown to take
just over an hour [101]. It is important to note that this optimization problem only needs
to be solved once, as the support vectors (α) and kernel weights (β) can be used to classify
all of the newly collected data. A general architecture diagram of this method is given in
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Figure 4.5.
4.3 Experimental Setup
In this section, I present my results on a dataset composed of 1,556 samples, 780 malicious
programs and 776 benign programs. I also present results on a separate dataset composed
of 20,936 malicious samples.
The metrics I use to quantify the results are classification accuracy (TPs+TNs/(# of
samples)), receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves [16], area under the ROC curve
(AUC) [20], and the average time it takes to classify a new instance. I look at three com-
bination strategies: just static views, just dynamic views, and a combination with all six of
the data views. I compare the combined kernel method against methods based on a single
data view. I conclude this section with some interesting observations based on these results.
To perform the experiments, I used a machine with quad Xeon X5570s running at
2.93GHz with 24GB of memory. To perform the multiple kernel learning, I used the modular
Python interface of the Shogun Machine Learning Toolbox [102].
4.4 Results
Accuracy. Table 4.2 presents results for the individual kernels as well as the combined
kernels using 10-fold cross validation. The three best performing antivirus programs (out
of 11 that I had available licenses) are also shown. For the antivirus program results, it is
important to emphasize that the malicious dataset was not composed of zero-day malware,
but rather malware that is at least 9 months to one year old. Despite this, the worst
performing data view based on the file information feature vector still had ∼6% better
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Method Acc (%) FPs FNs AUC
All Six Data Views 98.07% 16 14 .9978
Three Static Views 96.14% 36 24 .9934
Two Dynamic Views 88.75% 88 87 .9509
Binary 88.11% 93 92 .9437
Disassembled Binary 89.97% 71 85 .9483
CFG (4-graphlets) 88.05% 88 98 .9361
Dynamic Instructions 87.34% 92 105 .9335
Dynamic System Call 87.08% 88 113 .9368
File Information 84.83% 126 110 .9111
Avira 78.46% 4 331 n/a
BitDefender 75.26% 7 378 n/a
Kaspersky 71.79% 0 439 n/a
Table 4.2: The classification accuracy, number of false positives and false negatives, and
the full AUC values for 776 instances of benign software versus 780 instances of malware.
Statistically significant winners are bolded.
Method .01 .05 .1 .25 .5 Full AUC
All Six Data Views .9467 .9867 .9933 1.0 1.0 .9978
Three Static Views .9224 .9634 .9812 1.0 1.0 .9934
Two Dynamic Views .5000 .8487 .8882 .9605 .9803 .9509
Binary .5369 .7919 .8523 .9262 .9597 .9437
Disassembled Binary .5574 .7347 .8699 .9628 .9878 .9483
CFG (4-graphlets) .4182 .6814 .8724 .9378 .9675 .9361
Dynamic Instructions .3401 .6395 .7211 .9116 .9796 .9335
Dynamic System Call .5266 .7337 .8580 .9586 .9763 .9368
File Information .0946 .4527 .7703 .9054 .9730 .9111
Table 4.3: AUC values for the full ROC curve as well as values for five different false positive
rates: .01, .05, .1, .25, and .5. The combined kernel composed of all six data views performs
the best at all values.
classification accuracy than the best antivirus program. All but one of the false positives
found by the antivirus programs were actually confirmed to be true positives as discussed
later in this section.
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Figure 4.6: ROC curves for all six individual kernels, a kernel based on the three static views,
a kernel based on the two dynamic views, and the combined kernel composed of all six data
views. It is easy to see that the kernel based on all six data views performs significantly
better than the other kernels. The full AUC values for the kernels are are listed in legend in
parenthesis.
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The best performing method was the combined kernel that used all six data views and
achieved an accuracy of 98.07%. Although the static views also performed very well (96.14%),
adding dynamic information improved overall performance with respect to accuracy and false
positives. All of the single data views achieved between 84% to 89% accuracy with the single
data view winner being the disassembled binary at 89.97%.
ROC Curves / AUC Values. To analyze the different data views with respect to different
false positive thresholds, I looked at the ROC curves and various ROC points representing
different false positive rates. Figure 4.6 plots all the ROC curves together (including the
combined kernels) along with a zoomed version of the curve. Figure 4.6 (b) is particularly
informative as the combined kernel, which includes all six data views, clearly performs better
than any single data view or the two other combined kernels for all false positive rates. If
there are certain time and/or other resource constraints, Figure 4.6 (b) also shows that
reasonably high results can be achieved by just using the kernel based on the three static
views which is valuable in time-sensitive environments.
Table 4.3 displays the full AUC value, as well as the AUC values for five different false
positive rates: 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, and 0.5. By integrating all six data views, an AUC
value of .9467 can be achieved with a .01 false positive rate, significantly higher than any
other kernel based on a single data view, which adds support for the power of my approach
and multiple kernel learning in general. The file information data view performs the worst
with respect to this metric, and as I explain at the end of this section, I expect this is due
to misclassifying a large percentage of files that are packed and/or have abnormal entropy
values.
Learned Kernel Weights. The kernel weights learned from Equation 4.8 are an interesting
way to look at how informative different data views are with respect to the classification
accuracy. The weights I found for the different data views are shown in Table 4.4. It is
interesting to note that the weights are not representative of how well the single data view
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Data View All Views Static Views Dyn Views
Binary .2248 .2671 N/A
Disassembled .2576 .3284 N/A
CFG .1559 .4046 N/A
Dyn Instrs .3299 N/A .5817
System Calls 0.0 N/A .4183
File Info .0319 N/A N/A
Table 4.4: The kernel weights learned from Equation 4.8 for the different kernel combinations
examined.
does at classification. For example, the dynamic instruction view has the highest kernel
weight among the weights for all six views, but in these experiments, the binary, disassembled
and CFG all individually have higher accuracy than the dynamic instruction view.
Speed. Due to the fact that computing the kernel for each dataset, finding the kernel weights
for the combined kernels, and finding the support vectors for the support vector machine
are all essentially O(1) operations (all of these calculations need only to be performed once,
offline), I will focus the analysis of the timing results on the average amount of time it takes
to classify a new instance. The time to find the kernel weights and support vectors for the
kernel composed of all six data views, averaged over 10 runs, was only 0.86 seconds.
Given a new program instance to classify, there are two or three steps to be performed,
depending on whether a dynamic data view is used:
1. Run the instance in a virtual machine keeping a log of the instructions and system
calls the program performs.
2. Transform the data view into the appropriate data representation.
3. Classify the transformed data instance according to Equation 3.11.
In the timing results, I allow five minutes to collect the dynamic trace data. Transforming
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Figure 4.7: Plot demonstrating the trade-off between accuracy and time to classify. Time
is in seconds and the x-axis is the time it takes to first collect the dynamic trace (for the
dynamic data views), transform the data instance into its representation, and finally classify
the instance.
the data to its appropriate representation could mean several different things for each of the
different data views. For instance, the data might have to be disassembled, the 2-grams
in the disassembled data found, and finally the Markov chain built; the control flow graph
might have to be built and the number of graphlets with a specific structure found; in the
case of the file information data view, the statistics of Table 4.1 will have to be collected;
etc.
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Method Trace Data Transformation Classify Total
All Six Data Views 300.0s 3.12s 0.21s 303.52s
Three Static Views n/a 1.18s 0.13s 2.03s
Two Dynamic Views 300.0s 1.94s 0.06s 302.53s
Binary n/a 0.26s 0.05s 0.31s
Disassembled Binary n/a 0.63s 0.05s 0.68s
CFG (4-graphlets) n/a 0.97s 0.06s 1.03s
Dynamic Instructions 300.0s 1.10s 0.04s 301.15s
Dynamic System Call 300.0s 0.82s 0.01s 300.83s
File Information 300.0s 1.41s 0.01s 301.41s
Table 4.5: The average time it takes from receiving the raw data until a classification decision.
This time includes running the program for the dynamic views (5 minutes is allowed for the
tracing), transforming the data to the appropriate representation (which includes the time to
disassemble the code, collecting all of the 2-grams from the trace files, building the Markov
chains, etc.), and finally computing the class from the decision function of Equation 3.11.
The timing results, which are broken down into the three stages, are presented in Table
4.5 and are pictorially featured in Figure 4.7. These results were averaged over the entire
dataset. Classifying an instance takes very little time, and the only real bottleneck is the
time to collect the dynamic trace. The combined kernel composed of the three static views
is especially impressive as it has great performance and it takes only 2.03 seconds on average
to transform the data and make a classification decision. Using the combined kernel based
on the static data views, assuming 2.03 seconds per data instance, it would be possible to
classify up to 42,561 new samples each day. Again, the methods presented in this chapter
are highly parallelizable, and these methods will scale with more computational resources
because the kernel computations for classifying a new program instance can all be done in
parallel.
Testing on a Large Malware Sample. As explained earlier in this section, obtaining
a large benign dataset is difficult. On the other hand, besides the 780 malicious programs
discussed earlier, I had an additional 20,936 malware samples at my disposal from the Los
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Method Accuracy (%)
All Six Data Views 97.97%
Three Static Views 95.27%
Two Dynamic Views 91.57%
Binary 86.76%
Disassembled Binary 88.23%
Control Flow Graph (4-graphlets) 85.92%
Dynamic Instructions 88.42%
Dynamic System Call 86.38%
File Information 84.46%
BitDefender 57.55%
Avira 56.01%
Kaspersky 55.32%
Table 4.6: The classification accuracy on a validation dataset consisting on 20,936 malicious
samples.
Alamos National Laboratory repository. I am treating this data as a validation set to test
the generalization accuracy of my methods. I first train on all of the 1,556 samples (780
malicious and 776 benign), find the β’s and α’s, and finally classify the held out 20,936
malicious samples as either benign or malicious according to Equation 3.11.
The results for this experiment are shown in Table 4.6. The classification accuracies are
similar to those of previous section with the exception that the signature-based antivirus
programs do worse. This is due to the fact that in the original dataset, these methods
would always get close to 100% accuracy on the benign samples giving a positive skew to
their results because they had very few false positives on this dataset. As with the previous
results, by combining data views in the multiple kernel learning framework, I was able to
achieve a large increase in classification accuracy. The results presented in Table 4.6 suggest
that these methods would generalize very well to larger datasets given that they performed
well on this validation set.
Observations. A well-known problem in any supervised machine learning setting is the
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integrity of the training dataset. In training the classifier, I assumed that the labeled benign
samples in the dataset were actually benign. This was reasonable as the executables were
taken from clean installations of commercial software. To test this hypothesis, I ran the
classifier based on the combined kernel, with all six data views, using 10-fold cross validation
50 times and counted how many times a data instance was classified incorrectly. I found 19
data instances that were consistently misclassified, 8 which were labeled as malicious and
11 which were labeled as benign. 5 of the 11 benign samples were found to actually be
malicious using VirusTotal [114]. It is interesting that this method was able to reduce the
original 1,556 instance dataset to a manageable size of 19 suspicious samples, making closer
manual inspection of these files more manageable. Note that I did not correct the dataset
for the experiments in this chapter, and these 5 files are still considered false positives in the
previous results.
Traditional static analysis techniques have been shown to be insufficient given the rise
of newer malware obfuscation techniques [79]. Due to these limitations, I chose to include
dynamic data views to improve malware classification despite the time constraints these data
collection methods impose. To further analyze the pitfalls of the static data views, I again
ran the combined kernel with all six data views, a kernel with all of the static data views, a
kernel with all of the dynamic data views, and the six separate kernels, one for each of the six
different data views 50 times, keeping track of the files that were consistently misclassified
with respect to each kernel. In each of the 50 runs, 10-fold cross-validation was performed
with a random split.
Table 4.7 shows the percentage of files consistently misclassified which were packed. The
kernel based on the binary data had significant problems classifying packed benign instances,
as one would expect, with 43.75% of the false positives being packed (only 19.59% of all
benign instances in the training data were packed). On the other hand, using dynamic data
views, the percentage of false positives that was packed is the same as the packed percentage
of the training data, which suggests that the kernels based on these data views were not
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Method Benign Malicious
All Six Data Views 0.00% 70.00%
Three Static Views 20.00% 36.84%
Two Dynamic Views 18.75% 45.95%
Binary 43.75% 43.14%
Disassembled Binary 10.20% 53.85%
CFG (4-graphlets) 13.89% 55.10%
Dynamic Instructions 20.00% 38.24%
Dynamic System Call 21.62% 32.56%
File Information 28.09% 34.31%
Full Dataset Average 19.59% 47.56%
Table 4.7: Percentage of files that were packed and misclassified over all 50 runs with the
different kernels. Note the average percentage of packed files in the entire dataset is 19.59%
and 47.56% for benign and malicious files, respectively.
Method Benign Malicious
All Six Data Views 7.43 6.77
Three Static Views 7.41 6.91
Two Dynamic Views 6.26 7.50
Binary 7.42 7.01
Disassembled Binary 6.15 7.58
CFG (4-graphlets) 6.12 7.66
Dynamic Instructions 6.29 7.57
Dynamic System Call 6.41 7.55
File Information 7.77 5.98
Full Dataset Average 6.34 7.52
Table 4.8: Average entropy of files misclassified over all 50 runs with the different kernels.
Note that the average entropies over the entire dataset are 6.34 and 7.52 for benign and
malicious files respectively.
deceived by the packer. Although dynamic traces of packed files also have an unpacking
“footprint,” it has been shown that 5 minutes for a dynamic trace is enough time for a
significant number of the instructions to represent the true behavior of the program [87].
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Table 4.8 shows the average entropy of files that were consistently misclassified. The link
between entropy and files being packed is well-known [75], therefore similar results to Table
4.7 are seen. Again, the two dynamic views’ classification accuracies seem to be independent
of the entropy as the average entropy of the files they misclassify corresponds to the average
entropy of the entire dataset. Also, much like the previous results, the binary data view had
problems with classifying instances whose entropies differed significantly from the norm. As
expected, the file information data view had the most problems with entropy (remember
that entropy is one of the seven features for this view), with average entropy of misclassified
benign and malicious files being 7.77 (average in dataset: 6.34) and 5.98 (average in dataset:
7.52), respectively.
Having a dynamic tracing tool that is able to evade detection from the program being
traced is essential to get an accurate picture of how the program actually behaves in the wild.
Unfortunately, some malware can detect if it is being run in a virtual environment and/or
being traced [12]. I chose the Intel Pin program [73] because it allowed the collection of both
instructions and system calls simultaneously, is stable, and is currently being supported by
Intel. Unfortunately, it does not make an effort to be a transparent tracing tool like the
Ether framework [35]. The dynamic instruction data view’s classification accuracy in this
Chapter is lower than that reported in the literature [1,31], and I suspect that this is in part
due to Intel Pin not being transparent and the malware altering its own behavior.
To test this hypothesis, I looked at 8 malicious data instances that were consistently
misclassified (over 50 runs) by the kernel based on the dynamic instruction data view. I first
collected the dynamic traces with both Intel Pin and Ether and then computed the kernel
values between the resulting Markov chains of these traces. These results are displayed in
Table 4.9. Note that a kernel value of zero represents completely orthogonal behavior between
the two traces (no instruction transitions in common) and a kernel value of one represents
exactly the same program behavior between the two traces, which would be highly unlikely
even if the same tracing tool was used for both samples (a kernel value of 0 is also highly
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Malware Sample K(Tracepin,Traceether)
sample0 .9010
sample1 .8392
sample2 .8171
sample3 .7719
sample4 .6424
sample5 .5864
sample6 .5399
sample7 .3725
Table 4.9: The kernel values between two Markov chains of the same program’s dynamic
instruction trace, one trace run with Intel Pin, and one trace run with the Ether framework.
The kernel values were computed using Equation 4.1.
unlikely for obvious reasons). Although this is a coarse measure as to whether the program
alters its behavior, it does give some useful information as to why these instances could have
been classified incorrectly. The lower values of sample4, sample5, sample6, and sample7 are
particularly interesting and suggest that their dynamic instruction traces are substantially
different under the different tracing tools.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that significant benefits, with respect to both classification
accuracy and number of false positives, can be gained when malware researchers use all
of the information about executables that are available to perform classification, and not
just a single data view. I was able to achieve an accuracy of 98.07% on a dataset of 780
malware and 776 benign instances. I showed that while I had 16 false positives in this
dataset, several of these were later confirmed to be true positives. The ROC curve analysis
showed significant increases in performance when the data views were combined, and also
that acceptable performance can be achieved with just static views in a resource constrained
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environment.
I demonstrated several interesting observations about the results, illustrating some of the
pitfalls of both static analysis and dynamic analysis techniques. Namely that static data
views have problems classifying instances that are packed and/or have abnormal entropy
values. I also gave some support to the importance of having a dynamic tracing tool that is
capable of evading detection from the malware so that a truly representative sample of how
the malware actually behaves in the wild can be collected.
An important distinction should be made about the target audience of this line of re-
search, namely, that it is not intended to be used in a home computing environment. Sig-
nificant computational resources need to be devoted to collect the different views. A use
case would be first collect a program to be analyzed, either through user submissions or live
data feeds (e.g. harvesting email attachments). Then, send this file to a cluster of machines
devoted to collecting dynamic traces and other appropriate views. Finally, send the final
classification score to your incidence response team for further action.
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Multiple Kernel Learning Clustering
Accurately classifying executables as malicious or benign is only the first step towards mit-
igating an attack. Clustering malicious programs has become an important next step for
decreasing the response time of a computer security incident. The majority of new malware
is created through simple modifications of older instances, such as adding some new func-
tionality or slightly modifying the code base to avoid detection [124]. Typically, a reverse
engineer is assigned to understand the capabilities of a new instance of malware and how to
mitigate the damage it has caused. Being able to assign the unknown instance to a known
family of malicious programs, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, allows the reverse engineer to
apply techniques learned from reverse engineering previously seen instances of this family,
greatly reducing the time it takes to develop an appropriate response.
Similar to the previous chapters, I begin by defining a kernel, a general measure of
similarity, for each view and wish to find a linear combination of these kernels that can
be used in a spectral clustering framework. Although well-established methods have been
proposed to solve the multiple kernel learning problem in a classification setting [9,62,101],
multiple kernel learning with a clustering objective function has had far less exposure.
In this work, I propose a novel solution to the multiple kernel learning (MKL) problem
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Figure 5.1: An example of clustering malware.
based on a spectral clustering objective function [74]. I show how to modify the unnormalized
and the normalized Laplacians [26], which have both been used with success in spectral
clustering, so that they can explicitly take the multiple views of a dataset into account. A
spectral clustering objective function was chosen for its ability to take advantage of kernel
matrices and for its superior results on a wide range of clustering problems [74, 118, 122].
I show how this new objective function can be formulated as an equivalent semidefinite
program and efficiently solved using off-the-shelf interior point methods [3].
The primary benefit of the proposed approach is its ability to cluster instances based
on multiple views with no a priori information as to which view is the most informative,
something that is needed for some earlier attempts at clustering with multiple views [68,126].
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Another important benefit is that the kernel weight vector found can be viewed as a way to
rank the importance of the individual views. Some forms of data collection are expensive,
e.g. collecting dynamic traces requires a large amount of resources and real-time. It would
be useful to determine the value of each view and focus resources on collecting the views
that seem to contribute the most to the clustering problem.
I use a variety of datasets to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed methods, includ-
ing several datasets taken from the UCI machine learning repository [38]. In addition to
the UCI datasets, I have a dataset composed of 606 malicious executables separated into
12 distinct malicious families. Families consist of malware with a common codebase and
inherited functionality. For example, there are unique instances of the Bagle family which
is associated with mass-mailing spam and unique instances of the koobface family which is
famously linked to gathering login information and sending unwanted Facebook messages. I
compare the proposed method to several baselines: the best single view, simple kernel addi-
tion, multiple kernel learning based on a classification objective function, and two recently
proposed methods using co-regularized spectral clustering [68]. The adjusted Rand index
[49] is used to quantify the results.
5.1 MKL Clustering Algorithm
Let the multiple view dataset be denoted by D = D1∪· · ·∪DM where there exist M distinct
views, and each view is composed of n feature vectors, one for each data instance. In all of
the work that follows, I begin by defining a kernel on each view. As stated in the previous
chapter, the goal of multiple kernel learning is to find an optimal weight vector, β, for the
linear combination of kernels,
∑M
k βkKk, such that βk ≥ 0 and
∑M
k βk = 1. In the spectral
clustering framework presented here, each kernel matrix is treated as a weighted adjacency
matrix.
Typically, multiple kernel learning algorithms have been developed to extend the support
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vector machine (SVM) optimization problem [101]:
max
β∈Rk
min
α∈Rn
M∑
k=1
βkSk(α) (5.1)
s.t. β ≥ 0
M∑
k
βk = 1
n∑
i=1
αiyi = 0
for all α ∈ Rn with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1C, where C allows for soft margins [22], and where
Sk(α) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αiαjyiyjKk(xi,xj)−
n∑
i=1
αi (5.2)
Equation 5.2 is the classic support vector machine optimization problem for a single kernel,
Kk(·, ·). Equation 5.1 constructs a maximum-margin hyperplane separating two classes with
respect to both the support vectors, α, and the kernel weights, β.
While the kernel weights found with Equation 5.1 are optimal for a classification setting,
it is not clear that they are optimal for the clustering domain. Furthermore, it is unrealistic
to have labeled data for all domains, making Equation 5.1 unusable. This section describes
an optimization framework that modifies the spectral clustering objective function to take
multiple views into account. I begin by defining the spectral clustering problem with a
single view, then go on to show how to extend spectral clustering to take multiple views
into account for both the unnormalized and normalized Laplacian. Finally, I show how to
state the optimization problem as a semidefinite program and outline an algorithm to find
the optimal β’s.
Given an adjacency matrix K and a diagonal matrix D with entries dii =
∑
j kij, spectral
clustering finds an approximation to the relaxed mincut problem for graphs, optimizing
RatioCut [74] by using the unnormalized graph Laplacian:
Lun = D −K (5.3)
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and optimizing normalized cut [74] by using the normalized graph Laplacian:
Lnorm = I −D−1K (5.4)
The goal is to find an indicator matrix associating each vertex in the graph to a partition
of the graph. The relaxed version of mincut that spectral clustering solves allows entries of
the indicator matrix to be real-valued with the following formulation:
min
U∈Rn×k
tr(UTLU) (5.5)
s.t. UTU = I
where U can be directly solved for as the top k eigenvectors associated with the smallest
non-zero eigenvalues of L. With U found, a clustering algorithm such as k-means can be run
with the rows of U serving as the features.
To extend Equation 5.5 to take multiple views of the data into account, Equations 5.3
and 5.4 need to be modified to use the multiple view version of the unnormalized Laplacian:
Lun(β) =
M∑
i
βiDi −
M∑
i
βiKi (5.6)
and the multiple view version of the normalized Laplacian:
Lnorm(β) = I −
(
M∑
i
βiDi
)−1( M∑
i
βiKi
)
(5.7)
The problem is to now find β such that Equation 5.5 is minimized:
min
U∈Rn×k
tr(UTL(β)U) (5.8)
s.t. UTU = I
To solve for both U and β, I propose an iterative algorithm. Assuming no a priori
information as to which view is more informative, I begin by initializing βi = 1/M . U is
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Figure 5.2: Architecture diagram for the MKL clustering algorithm.
then found through an eigendecomposition as is standard with spectral clustering. With an
initial U , β can be found with a semidefinite program.
Using the identity that the trace function is equivalent to the sum of the eigenvalues of a
matrix, tr(A) =
∑
i λi, and the relationship between the eigenvalues and the singular values
for a matrix, σi =
√
λi, the optimal β vector with respect to Equation 5.8 given U can be
solved for with the following semidefinite program:
min ||A(β)||∗ + 1
2
βTCβ (5.9)
s.t. Gβ  h
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where
G =

−1 0 · · ·
0
. . . 0
... 0 −1
· · · 1 · · ·
· · · −1 · · ·

(5.10)
and
h = [0 1 − 1]T (5.11)
The top negative identity matrix of G and 0 vector in h enforce non-negative β’s while
the last two constraints force the β’s to sum to one. || · ||∗ is the nuclear norm defined as∑n
i=1 σi where the σi’s are the singular values of the matrix. The quadratic regularization
term smooths the β vector according to the diagonal matrix C.
A(β) in Equation 5.9 is a linear combination of matrices, A(β) =
∑M
i=1 βiAi, which is
built by manipulating Equations 5.6 and 5.7. Ai serves as a proxy for the objective of
Equation 5.8, and a linear combination of the Ai’s is able to be used due to the linearity of
the trace function. For the unnormalized case:
Ai = U
T (Di −Ki)U (5.12)
and for the normalized case:
Ai = U
T
−Ki( M∑
j
βjDj
)−1U (5.13)
The derivations for Equations 5.12 and 5.13 are given in Appendices A.1 and A.2. The βj’s
of Equation 5.13 and the U matrix are the values found in the previous iteration.
Algorithm 1 outlines my framework for finding the optimal kernel weights for multiple
kernel learning with a clustering objective function. The final steps of the algorithm follow
the spectral clustering framework, but using the multiple view Laplacian, L(β), in place of
the standard, single-view Laplacian. Figure 5.2 gives a pictorial overview of the process.
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Algorithm 1 Multiple kernel learning clustering algorithm, iteratively finds optimal β and
U , and then performs spectral clustering.
Require: initial β
U ← solve Equation 5.8
score ← tr(UTL(β)U)
while score is decreasing do
β ← min ||A(β)||∗ + 12βTCβ
s.t. Gβ  h
U ← minU∈Rn×k tr(UTL(β)U)
s.t. UTU = I
score ← tr(UTL(β)U)
end while
construct L(β)
find Un×k with Equation 5.8
Let xi ∈ Rk be the new feature vector corresponding to
the ith row of U
Ck ← k-means with x as the new feature space
return Clusters, Ck
5.1.1 Practical Concerns
Typically, β in Algorithm 1 would be initialized to reflect expert assumptions as to which
data views are a priori the most informative. Because it is not realistic to have expert
knowledge in all applications, in all of the results I present, I set each initial βi = 1/M where
M is the number of views.
The new feature space constructed by spectral clustering consists of a Un×k matrix, where
the columns are eigenvectors and the rows correspond to the new feature vectors, one for
each instance in the dataset. Choosing an appropriate k is application dependent and often
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Name Num Instances Num Attributes Num Classes
iris 150 4 3
wine 178 13 3
wdbc 569 32 2
ecoli 336 8 8
glass 214 10 6
Table 5.1: UCI Datasets
relies on heuristics [74]. I use the heuristic k = blog(n)c where n is the number of instances
in the dataset. This heuristic has been shown to work well on a variety of datasets [74].
The regularization term in Equation 5.9 depends on C, which controls how sparse the
algorithm will make the weight vectors of the solution, with higher values resulting in a less
sparse solution. In all of the experiments presented in this chapter, I set C = I · 0.1.
5.2 Experimental Setup
5.2.1 UCI Datasets
I first compare my methods on several datasets taken from the UCI machine learning repos-
itory [38]. These datasets are given in Table 5.1 with the number of instances, attributes,
and classes. Because none of these datasets naturally has multiple views, several synthetic
views were created by defining different types of kernels, as well as kernels with different
parameter values. The first kernel used was the Gaussian kernel:
KG(x,x
′) = e−
λ
2
∑
i(xi−x′i)2 (5.14)
I created three artificial views using this kernel for each UCI dataset by adjusting λ by
different orders of magnitude (i.e. for the iris dataset I used values of 1.0, 0.1, and 0.01). A
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Family Name Number of Instances
bagle 49
bifrose 61
hupigon 76
koobface 31
ldpinch 44
lmir 69
rbot 11
sdbot 26
swizzor 76
vundo 56
zbot 43
zlob 64
Table 5.2: Malware Families.
polynomial kernel was also used:
KP (x,x
′) = (αx · x′)p (5.15)
where p ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This gives a total of six synthetic views for each of the UCI dataset.
5.2.2 Malware Dataset
The dataset which motivated this work is based on 606 samples of malicious programs
separated into 12 distinct families, as labeled from antivirus vendors, and was collected over
a 6 month period beginning in August 2011. The family names and the number of instances
from each family are listed in Table 5.2.
Six distinct views of malware were used as described in the previous chapters, and include
the binary bytes, disassembled instructions, the control flow graph, dynamic instructions,
system calls, and a general file information feature vector.
Four of the six data views are sequence-based. The sequences are used to condition the
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transition probabilities of a Markov chain as shown in Figure 4.2 and described in Chapter
3. For each of the data views based on the Markov chain representation, I use a Gaussian
kernel (Equation 5.14) with x being the entries in the transition probability matrix of the
given instance. Although more advanced graph kernels exist, I found this simple kernel to
perform the best under most circumstances. I refer the reader to Chapter 4 for an in-depth
description on computing kernels for each of the six views.
5.2.3 Competing Methods
The previously described method finds a weight vector, β, such that Equation 5.8 is min-
imized. The baseline methods I compare to include the most informative view, i.e., {βi =
1, βj 6=i = 0}. For my experiments I looked at every available view and only report the view
with the best results. I also use a uniform combined kernel where {∀i|βi = 1/M}. The final
method compared against that revolves around finding β is based on classic multiple kernel
learning with a classification objective function [101]. To perform this optimization, I used
the SHOGUN machine learning toolbox [102].
While I propose first combining the multiple views according to the weight vector β, and
then finding the spectral embedding, U , used in the k-means step, other recent work has
proposed a co-regularization scheme to combine kernels [68]. The first method proposed in
[68] used pair-wise regularization:
min
Ui∈Rn×k
tr
(
UTi
(
Li + λ
M∑
j 6=i
UjU
T
j
)
Ui
)
(5.16)
s.t. UTi Ui = I
Each Ui is initialized by solving the spectral clustering objective function for that specific
view. After initialization of the single views, Equation 5.16 is repeatedly solved for Ui,
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holding all other Uj constant. After convergence, choosing which view to use for k-means is
still an open question and often relies on a priori information. In my experiments, I clustered
on all views and report the best results.
The second co-regularized spectral clustering algorithm presented is the centroid method
[68]:
min
U∗∈Rn×k
tr
(
UT∗
(
M∑
i
λiUiU
T
i
)
U∗
)
(5.17)
s.t. UT∗ U∗ = I
Like the pair-wise method, the centroid method is an iterative algorithm, first initializing Ui
according to the Laplacian for the ith view, and then solving Equation 5.17 for U∗. Then, at
the beginning of each iteration, it solves for Ui, i = 1, . . . ,M , with the modified Laplacian,
Li + λiU∗UT∗ before solving for the updated U∗.
Unlike the pair-wise co-regularization, the centroid method finds a single feature space
embedding, U∗. Although a single embedding is found, a priori information about the impor-
tance of the views is still explicit in Equation 5.17 as λi. In my experiments, I used several
values for λi, including the uniform 1 vector, the classic MKL weights, and the weights
found with both my unnormalized and normalized approaches. Only the results for the best
performing weights are reported.
5.3 Results
Table 5.3 displays my results in terms of the adjusted Rand index [49] on both the UCI
datasets and the malware dataset consisting of 606 malware instances from 12 distinct ma-
licious families. Although each dataset had labels attached to it, the labels were only used
to compute the adjusted Rand index and to compute the weights for the classification-based
MKL algorithm. Neither my proposed algorithm nor the competing methods of [68] make
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SDP SDP Best Uniform Classic Centroid Pair-wise
unnorm norm View Combination MKL
Malware .8747 .8768 .8174 .8381 .8531 .8702 .8477
iris .8923 .9414 .8030 .8343 .8236 .9124 .8687
wine .4137 .4331 .3744 .4035 .3813 .4249 .3924
wdbc .5072 .5941 .4510 .4863 .5019 .5463 .4913
ecoli .6981 .7285 .6368 .6866 .7086 .7342 .6701
glass .2737 .2941 .2318 .2438 .2613 .2705 .2318
Table 5.3: Adjusted Rand Index
use of these labels. My algorithm based on the normalized Laplacian performed the best on
4 out of the 5 UCI datasets, but not on the ecoli dataset, where the centroid method was
the overall winner. As stated previously, this method needs a priori information describing
which views of the data are more informative, with this information being encoded in the
λi’s of Equation 5.17. The λ values for the ecoli dataset that performed the best were the
β’s found with the presented normalized Laplacian approach.
The multiple kernel learning algorithms based on the unnormalized and normalized Lapla-
cians have superior performance compared to all other methods on the malware dataset. I
observed that the instances that were clustered incorrectly were very similar to the other
malicious programs in that cluster. For instance, the Lmir and Hupigon trojans had some
crossover in the clusters found, but both have many components related to keylogging and
password stealing, implying that their views are similar. Likewise, the rbot and sdbot mal-
ware had some misplaced instances, but they both share a common lineage. sdbot is derived
from the agobot family, and rbot is derived from sdbot. Both have irc command and control
functionality with the distinction that sdbot is more focused on DDoS attacks and rbot has
more keylogging features. Thus, although they were technically incorrect, their clustering
could still provide useful information to reverse engineers.
Table 5.4 lists the time taken in seconds to perform the optimization. For my methods, as
well as multiple kernel learning based on a classification objective function, this means finding
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SDP unnormalized SDP normalized Classic MKL Centroid Pair-wise
Malware 5.2363 5.8886 3.8057 14.1613 11.2255
iris 0.5322 0.8390 0.4861 2.5610 1.4104
wine 0.9268 1.0301 0.6810 3.2838 2.5101
wdbc 4.7849 5.0183 3.3595 12.1373 10.9162
ecoli 4.0267 4.7754 2.1583 7.7050 6.7499
glass 1.4543 1.7962 0.7340 3.4259 2.3781
Table 5.4: Time to perform optimization, in seconds
the weight vector, β, and the feature space embedding, U , of the Laplacian associated with
the combined kernel. For the pair-wise and centroid methods, this means finding the Uv’s
and U∗ of Equation 5.16 and Equation 5.17. Although classic MKL is the fastest algorithm
on all applications, the presented methods are faster than the competing multiview clustering
algorithms. In Section 5.4.1, I mention several ideas that could greatly decrease the runtime
of my methods and improve the scalability of my methods.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented a novel multiple kernel learning method which is based on
a clustering objective function. Specifically, I incorporated multiple views into the spectral
clustering objective function, and showed how to optimize the multiple kernel learning weight
vector using a semidefinite program. This algorithm iteratively finds the weight vector which
is optimal with respect to the spectral clustering objective function which computes the
feature space embedding used in the k-means algorithm.
I developed these techniques for use in malware clustering, which has become an impor-
tant problem for the rapid response of a malware incident. Malicious programs are a natural
fit for multiple kernel learning methods as they contain many, well researched views such as
dynamic traces, binary data, the disassembled file, and the control flow graph. I have shown
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that this method has superior performance compared to several baseline methods as well as
two state-of-the-art multiple view spectral clustering algorithms.
5.4.1 Future Work
Because the proliferation of malware has drastically increased over the years, the scalability of
any proposed method is very important. The eigendecomposition, which must be performed
during each iteration of the algorithm to get U ∈ Rn×k, has a na¨ıve runtime of O(n3)
and becomes prohibitive for larger datasets. For the purposes of the presented algorithm,
only the top-k eigenvectors need to be acquired, which has been shown to be efficiently
computable by a decentralized algorithm [60]. Having a distributed means to computing the
top-k eigenvectors would greatly increase the scalability of this method.
Antivirus vendors have a constant incoming supply of malware, and models that can
incrementally cluster these instances would be very advantageous. There has been some
work on incremental spectral clustering techniques. In [81], the authors show how to update
the eigenvectors used for clustering in the event of the addition or deletion of an instance.
This is important for several reasons, namely avoiding the computation of recomputing all of
the eigenvectors. Also, newer instances of malware are constantly being collected and older
instances of malware become less relevant to the current malicious landscape and should be
pruned from the dataset. An interesting direction for future research would be to extend
their work to take multiple data views into account.
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Malware Phylogenetics
When beginning the process of understanding a new, previously unseen sample of malware,
it is advantageous to leverage the information gained from reverse engineering previously
seen members of that instance’s family because techniques learned from related instances
can often be applied to a new program instance. A malware family is a group of related
malware instances which share a common codebase and exhibit similar functionality (e.g.
different branches in a software repository). Unlike Chapter 5 where the goal was to find
clusters representing the families, this chapter focuses on extracting a more detailed picture
about the relationships between the malware instances within a given family.
In contrast to Figure 5.1, Figure 6.1 exhibits the proposed output of the ideal phylogenetic
algorithm. This figure clearly shows the evolution of the bagle virus [59] as a directed graph.
The information presented in Figure 6.1 is invaluable for a reverse engineer tasked with
understanding specific instances within a malware family as well as the general evolution of
the family. A key problem in developing an appropriate response to a new malware infection
is that of attribution: determining the author or organization behind the malware. The
creation of a phylogenetic graph is a critical first step in malware attribution.
In this chapter I describe a method based on the graphical lasso that finds a Gaussian
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Bagle.a
Bagle.b
Bagle.d
Bagle.g
Bagle.eBagle.n
Bagle.o
Bagle.q
Bagle.i
Bagle.j
Figure 6.1: An example of creating a phylogenetic graph for the bagle worm.
graphical model where the malware instances are represented as nodes, and the evolutionary
relationships are represented as edges. I present a novel extension to a standard algorithm
that shows how to incorporate multiple views of the data. Finally, I mention several heuristics
to force directionality within the Gaussian graphical model, allowing analysts to see exactly
how the family has evolved.
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6.1 Distance-Based Phylogenetic Reconstruction
Computing phylogenetic trees has been an active area of research within the malware do-
main, where the trees are constructed by common techniques motivated from biology [56,72].
Although maximum-likelihood phylogenetic methods [51] are popular in the biology commu-
nity [43,50], their computational complexity poses severe limitations in the malware domain.
Given a multiple sequence alignment [36] and a specific phylogenetic tree, the likelihood for
each character in the alignment must be computed. With n sequences and s states, the
computational complexity of computing the likelihood for the ith state is O(sn−2) [51]. This
is expensive yet tractable when considering data such as DNA where there are only 4 states
(A,G,T,C), but in the malware domain where the assembly instructions are the states, s is
typically in the hundreds. In addition to the computational complexity, there exists non-
sequence-based data such as the control flow graph, which is not suited to sequence-based
analysis. The control flow graph still contains important information about malware phy-
logeny, which we would not want to discard. Therefore, I only compare my proposed method
to distance-based methods, where the previously defined kernels can be easily adapted.
6.2 Graphical Lasso for Phylogenetic Reconstruction
Most malware phylogeny techniques in the literature rely on bifurcating tree-based ap-
proaches [33,46,53,116]. The shortcoming of these methods is that they do not give ancestral
relationships to the data. I pose a new problem: attribution-based phylogenetic reconstruc-
tion where the goal is to find a graph, G = 〈V,E〉. The vertices of the graph, V , are
the instances of malware and the directed edges of the graph, E, represent phylogenetic
relationships between the data such as “child of” or “parent of”.
In Figure 6.2, I show the difference between the output of the two approaches. Both
approaches contain valuable information, but I argue that the information on Figure 6.2
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Figure 6.2: The difference between the two proposed clustering approaches on the same
underlying data set. The typical hierarchical clustering that has been done in the past is
shown in (a), and an example of the output of the proposed attribution-based phylogenetic
reconstruction method is shown in (b).
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(b) is more helpful from a reverse engineering standpoint. The main advantage of the new
approach is that the graph from attribution-based phylogenetic reconstruction explicitly
states the phylogenetic relationships between instances of malware. For a reverse engineer,
knowing that an instance of malware is similar to known malware, say from the same family,
rapidly speeds up the reverse engineering process as the analyst will have a general idea
of the mechanisms used by the sample. It is more informative to know the set of parents
from which a given sample’s functionality is derived. Malware having multiple parents is
becoming increasingly common [45]. Having malware which is a composite of several other
samples is becoming more widespread as malware authors are beginning to use standard
software engineering practices, thus making the reuse of code more prevalent.
6.2.1 Overview of Graphical Lasso
The solution I propose is unsupervised and based on the graphical lasso (glasso) [39], which
estimates the phylogenetic graph by finding a sparse precision matrix based on the combined
kernel matrix. Glasso maximizes the Gaussian log-likelihood with respect to the precision
matrix, Θ = Σ−1, of the true covariance (kernel) matrix, Σ:
max
Θ
{log(det(Θ))− tr(KΘ)− ||Θ ◦ P ||1} (6.1)
where K is the sample covariance matrix, which in this case means the kernel matrix for a
given view of malware. || · ||1 is the classic L1 norm used in standard lasso, P is a matrix
penalizing specific edges of the precision matrix, and ◦ is the Hadamard product. There
have been several efficient algorithms developed to solve Equation 6.1 that I take advantage
of in this work [10,39].
By finding the precision matrix with an L1 penalty, I am seeking a sparse graph that
captures the conditional independencies of the true covariance matrix. For instance, if there
exists three examples of malware with a direct lineage (xc is derived from xb, xb is derived
from xa), then the na¨ıve approach of creating links between similar examples would create a
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completely connected graph between these samples. This would not be unreasonable as they
are all similar. The strength of glasso is that it leverages the precision matrix to discover
that xc and xa are conditionally independent given xb, which would omit the edge between
xc and xa.
6.2.2 Modifying Graphical Lasso for Multiple Views
Equation 6.1 solves the problem of finding a Gaussian graphical model for a single view. The
obfuscation techniques of malware make this an insufficient solution as individual views can
often be unreliable as shown in Chapter 4. Instead, the following multiview problem should
be solved:
max
Θ,β
{
log(det(Θ))− tr
(
M∑
i=1
(βiKi) Θ
)
− ||Θ ◦ P ||1 − λ||β||2
}
(6.2)
Using the linearity of the trace function and rearranging terms:
min
Θ,β
{
M∑
i=1
βitr(KiΘ)− log(det(Θ)) + ||Θ ◦ P ||1 + λ||β||2
}
(6.3)
s.t.
∑
i
βi = 1
∀iβi ≥ 0
The algorithm I employ is based on alternating projections, first finding the optimal Θ
while holding β fixed and then finding the optimal β while holding Θ fixed. As I mentioned
previously, there are many efficient algorithms to solve for the optimal Θ [10,39]. To solve for
the optimal β assuming a fixed Θ, I first note that −log(det(Θ)) + ||Θ ◦ P ||1 is independent
of β and can therefore be ignored in the optimization of β leaving us with:
min
β
{
M∑
i=1
βitr(KiΘ)
}
(6.4)
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Algorithm 2 Multiple View Graphical Lasso, iteratively finds optimal β and Θ, return Θ.
Require: initial β
score0 ← log(det(Θ))− tr
(∑M
i=1 (βiKi) Θ
)
− ||Θ ◦ P ||1
while scoret < scoret−1 do
ai = tr(KiΘ)
β ← min aTβ + 1
2
βTCβ
s.t. Gβ  h
K ←∑Mi=1 βiKi
Θ← maxΘ{log(det(Θ))− tr(KΘ)− ||Θ ◦ P ||1}
scoret ← log(det(Θ))− tr
(∑M
i=1 (βiKi) Θ
)
− ||Θ ◦ P ||1
end while
return precision matrix, Θ
If I let ai = tr(KiΘ), this problem can be stated as a quadratic program [19] allowing for
the use of many efficient algorithms:
min
β
aTβ +
1
2
βTCβ (6.5)
s.t. Gβ  h
where the simplex constraint forces β to sum to 1 and be non-negative, and 1
2
βTCβ removes
the incentive of having βi = 1, βj 6=i = 0. In the case of the degenerate solution, βi = 1, βj 6=i =
0, this procedure reduces to a feature selector basing all further optimizations on the one
best view. Intuitively, a more robust solution would make use of all available information. I
defend this intuitive claim in Section 6.2.6. Algorithm 2 outlines the procedure for finding
the optimal precision matrix, Θ, when given multiple views of the data.
6.2.3 Leveraging Clusters in Graphical Lasso
While Algorithm 2 solves Equation 6.3, I found that the uniform penalization of the
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Figure 6.3: NetworkMiner MKL glasso results with and without clustering.
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Algorithm 3 Multiple View Graphical Lasso, iteratively finds optimal β and Θ, return Θ.
Leverages cluster information to have different penalization throughout the precision matrix
Require: initial β
clusters, C ← Algorithm 1
for ck ∈ C do
ρ← (∑|ck|i,j Ki,j)/|ck|2
Θk ←perform Algorithm 2 with penalization ρ on cluster ck
end for
K ′ ← compute inter-cluster similarity matrix
ΘC ← perform Algorithm 2 with K ′
return precision matrices, ΘC , Θk
L1-norm led to an interesting phenomenon, namely, the resulting precision matrix was glob-
ally sparse with a small subset of the nodes being highly connected. This suggests that a
uniform penalty is not appropriate for this problem. Figure 6.3 highlights the advantages of
performing a clustering pre-processing step. In Figure 6.3a, many of the different versions
of NetworkMiner [80] are unconnected, effectively giving the analyst no information as to
their evolution. On the other hand, Figure 6.3b shows how clustering the instances can be
a huge advantage. Once similar versions of the program are clustered together, penalizing
the L1-norm uniformly within that cluster becomes more appropriate.
Leveraging clusters in the multiview graphical lasso is straightforward. First, the clusters,
C = c1, . . . , cn, are found using Algorithm 1 of Chapter 5. Then, the multiview graphical
lasso (Algorithm 2) is applied to each cluster, adjusting the penalty term appropriately.
To adjust the penalty, I used a heuristic, (
∑|ck|
i,j Ki,j)/|ck|2, which effectively penalizes self-
similar clusters heavily, allowing those clusters to be more sparse. Finally, I create a new set
of similarity matrices, but instead of measuring the similarity between different instances in
the dataset, this similarity matrix measures similarity between the different clusters. This
matrix is simply created by taking the average similarity between every x ∈ ci and y ∈
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cj. Performing the multiview glasso on these matrices finds the conditional independences
between the different clusters. Algorithm 3 details the procedure.
6.2.4 Forcing Directionality
The major drawback to the graphical lasso approach is that it does not find directed graphs,
but rather finds an undirected Gaussian graphical model. Because of this, it cannot identify
parent/child relationships, meaning that when a link between xa and xb is found, there is no
information as to whether xb is the child of xa or vice-versa. I have experimented with several
heuristics to determine the directionality of the edges in the Gaussian graphical model.
The first method, and seemingly the most accurate, is contained within the portable
executable (PE) header information. Here, there is a 32-bit value that contains the time and
date the PE file was compiled as seconds since January 1st, 1970 00:00:00. Unfortunately,
malware authors often obfuscate this field, either setting it to all 0’s, or even worse, setting
it to a seemingly legitimate, but inaccurate date. As a reference point for the prevelance of
this type of defense, the Bagle malware dataset had 9 out of 25 samples where this field was
obfuscated.
In the case where directionality cannot be reliably inferred from the PE header timestamp,
I fallback to using entropy, under the assumption that as programs evolve, they become more
complex. This has been shown to be a reasonable metric in the software engineering literature
[71]. While this is undoubtedly not correct for all programs, it has proven to be a somewhat
reliable last resort. In addition, it seems to be a more robust measure of a program’s evolution
compared to the intuitive measure of a program’s size. For both Algorithms 2 and 3, this
method of forcing directionality can be considered a post-processing step on the precision
matrices, Θ.
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Figure 6.4: The ground truth phylogeny for the bagle worm.
6.2.5 Data
To be able to accurately quantify my results, I must have access to ground truth, more
precisely, the true phylogenetic graph of the program. As one can imagine, this is a very
difficult, time-consuming process. Fortunately, it is made easier for some benign programs as
their subversion or github repositories can be used to gather this information. Unfortunately,
malware authors do not typically use these tools in an open setting, making the phylogenetic
graphs of malware much more difficult to obtain. To understand the evolution of a malware
family, I elicited the help of several experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory that are a
part of the computer security incident response team. These experts used several sources of
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Dataset Variants
Mytob a, b, c, f, j, n, t, v, x, ar, au, aw, bf, bi, ef, eg, ej, jb, ja, jd
Koobface a, b, d, e, g, h, k, q, t, y, z, ab, ad, af, ai, ak, ba, bc, bn
Bagle a, b, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, n, o, p, q, r, y, aa, af, bj, cb, dq, dr, ds, du, dx
NetworkMiner .71, .74, .75, .76, .77, .78, .8, .81, .82, .83, .84, .85, .86, .88, .89, .9, 1.0,
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4
Mineserver 05e8b7ae002496a810c68dda2d9783a9e3c2a013
0e290772a2e387be832d587596f983a4cf4c8b1f
20c721a331d411b193c20ab917b877cc50756dea
306bf349f9a4297b2cee4373f6b38c5b2dc18c6b
3761930a9cc5e9a2e2fd7d7ac0ab8bc961ff6f64
387585fd85761ddab76032c86cf425c452a23bc5
6bf36f39020acd3b4765ac7d6e98b77e2be0c33f
7120ec0443c43a722c68c833405742350d17d93a
97bab2ea91a303de3b1545d388fae576300acd47
a6ac3e47b3f4b2ad22b56b5f21effc73838f9538
bc932c828f94406c46db979d01a09f3e55e16fad
d9088e55d618954f0f467cb1e5d60d7c171e50ad
f694a73d1dc360c008bf8ccefa1b8afbf75cdc3e
Table 6.1: The variants used for each family. For the malicious families, the variants are
labels a → z, aa → az, etc. in order of first detection in the wild. NetworkMiner uses the
official version numbers supplied by the authors, and Mineserver uses the sha1, which is
searchable from the github repository.
information to come up with an informed graph depicting the evolution of malware, such as
the time the malware was first seen in the wild, the compile-time timestamp, the functionality
of the sample, and the obfuscation methods employed by the sample. While the phylogenetic
graphs the domain experts have manually found are by no means 100% accurate, they do
provide a reasonable baseline in a setting where ground truth is not available.
I use three malicious programs: Mytob, Koobface, and Bagle. These samples were ob-
tained from VX Heaven [115]. The specific variants used are listed in Table 6.1. Mytob is a
mass-mailing worm that seeks a user’s address book to then send itself to all of that user’s
contacts [111]. Several variations also have the ability to exploit network vulnerabilities to
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spread without the need of its internal SMTP engine. The Koobface worm spreads through
social networking sites with the intent of installing software for a botnet [110]. This worm
updates a user’s status with a link to some type of external media content, that is actually
another copy of the worm. Bagle is another mass-mailing worm, that creates a botnet [109].
It has the ability to download external content, as well as spread through file-sharing net-
works, such as Kazaa, by placing a copy of itself in the “share” folder. The expert derived
ground truth phylogeny of the bagle worm is shown in Figure 6.4, with all ground truth
phylogenies being shown in Appendix B.
In addition to the malicious programs, I validate my methods on two benign programs,
NetworkMiner and Mineserver, due to the ground truth for these graphs being more readily
available. NetworkMiner is a network forensics anaylsis tool specializing in packet sniffing
and parsing PCAP files [80]. Mineserver is a way to host worlds in the popular Minecraft
game [78].
6.2.6 Results
Table 6.3 lists all the results for the 5 datasets previously described with respect to precision,
recall, and F-norm. Figure 6.5 shows a hypothetical ground truth graph with a hypothetical
reconstructed graph. In this example, the precision would be 2/4 as 2 of the 4 reconstructed
edges are true positives with respect to the ground truth, and the recall would be 2/3 as
the reconstructed graph contains 2 out of the 3 true edges with respect to the ground truth.
The Frobenius norm, or F-norm, between 2 matrices is defined as:
||A−B||F =
√∑
i
∑
j
(Aij −Bij)2 (6.6)
which I compute by taking the Frobenius norm between the reconstructed graph and the
ground truth graph. I compare my multiview glasso + clustering approach to my multiview
glasso approach and regular glasso with and without the clustering preprocessor for both
88
Chapter 6. Malware Phylogenetics
Figure 6.5: On the left is a hypothetical ground truth graph and on the right is a hypothetical
reconstructed graph. In this example the precision would 2/4 and the recall would be 2/3.
the best single view and a uniform combination of views. I also compare my approach to
the Gupta algorithm [45] and a simple baseline, the minimum spanning tree.
As Table 6.3 demonstrates, the proposed method performs well on a variety of datasets,
both malicious and benign. The Gupta algorithm performs well with respect to precision, and
even out-performs my algorithm on the mineserver dataset, but this is mainly because it finds
sparser graphs, where precision will naturally be higher. The mineserver dataset is interesting
for two reasons: the ground truth is known with absolute certainty, and merges and branches
are present. Both of these cases are present in most real-word software engineering projects
including malware. Figure 6.6 shows the ground truth as well as the graph acquired with
the multiview glasso + clustering method. As the figure demonstrates, I was able to recover
the majority of the branches and merges, and can recover most of the evolutionary flow of
the program.
The cophenetic correlation coefficient is a measure of how well a hierarchical clustering
algorithm models the original distances. In this setting, the distances are based on the
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Hierarchical Clustering MKLGlasso+Clust
networkminer .3749 .5361
mineserver .4432 .6886
bagle .1167 .1733
mytob .1098 .3808
koobface .1424 .2463
Table 6.2: Cophenetic correlation coefficients comparing hierarchical clustering to my pro-
posed approach.
translated kernel values, between the data points [98], and is given by:
c =
∑
i<j(x(i, j)− x)(t(i, j)− t)√[∑
i<j(x(i, j)− x)2
] [∑
i<j(t(i, j)− t)2
] (6.7)
In Equation 6.7, t(i, j) is the distance between i and j by the model found, t is the average
distance between all instances found by the model, x(i, j) is the ground truth distance
between i and j, and x is an average of the ground truth distance between all instances.
Table 6.2 compares the cophenetic correlation coefficient between the MKL glasso +
clustering method I have presented and the UPGMA hierarchical clustering algorithm [125]
that has been typically used in this domain [56,72]. This table was included for completeness
to compare to hierarchical clustering methods, and these results should not be taken out of
context. While my method outperforms hierarchical clustering, this is mainly because it is
not restricted to dendrogram structures (i.e. bifurcating trees) [125], but rather have a much
more expressive model space.
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Dataset Method F-norm Precision Recall
NetworkMiner
MKLGlasso+Clust 4.5826 .4857 .85
MKLGlasso 5.5678 .3514 .65
Glasso-Best View 6.0 .2895 .55
Glasso-Best View+Clust 5.3852 .3902 .80
Glasso-Uniform Comb 6.1644 .3043 .70
Glasso-Uniform Comb+Clust 5.0 .4360 .85
Gupta 5.0 .3810 .40
Minimum Spanning Tree 5.6569 .35 .70
MineServer
MKLGlasso+Clust 4.0 0.7222 0.8125
MKLGlasso 5.4772 0.5833 0.2188
Glasso-Best View 5.8242 0.4118 0.1935
Glasso-Best View+Clust 4.8134 0.4510 0.3871
Glasso-Uniform Comb 5.6711 0.4314 0.1875
Glasso-Uniform Comb+Clust 4.4655 0.4902 0.4194
Gupta 4.7958 0.8462 0.3438
Minimum Spanning Tree 7.4833 0.0 0.0
Bagle
MKLGlasso+Clust 5.7446 0.20 0.3333
MKLGlasso 9.5394 0.0964 0.125
Glasso-Best View 10.7731 0.0704 0.1176
Glasso-Best View+Clust 5.5813 0.1480 .0909
Glasso-Uniform Comb 10.2921 0.0812 0.0980
Glasso-Uniform Comb+Clust 9.6476 .1351 .1220
Gupta 6.5574 0.12 0.125
Minimum Spanning Tree 8.3667 0.0208 0.0417
Mytob
MKLGlasso+Clust 7.9373 0.1563 0.5263
MKLGlasso 8.5348 0.0988 0.2258
Glasso-Best View 8.7388 0.0864 0.1935
Glasso-Best View+Clust 8.2184 0.1282 0.2903
Glasso-Uniform Comb 10.2766 0.0617 0.1951
Glasso-Uniform Comb+Clust 8.8117 0.1081 0.2683
Gupta 6.0828 0.05 0.0526
Minimum Spanning Tree 7.2801 0.0526 0.1053
Koobface
MKLGlasso+Clust 5.2915 0.5812 0.5
MKLGlasso 5.3852 0.2917 0.3889
Glasso-Best View 6.8551 0.2391 0.3171
Glasso-Best View+Clust 6.0427 0.2821 0.3235
Glasso-Uniform Comb 6.6043 0.2195 0.2927
Glasso-Uniform Comb+Clust 5.9486 0.3023 0.3636
Gupta 5.9161 0.3158 0.3333
Minimum Spanning Tree 7.2111 0.0278 0.0556
Table 6.3: Phylogenetic graph reconstruction results in terms of F-norm, Precision, and
Recall.
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Figure 6.6: Comparison between mineserver ground truth and the network identified by
Algorithm 3
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Conclusions
The primary thesis of this dissertation is that incorporating multiple views of malware pro-
vides a significant benefit compared to looking at only a single view for classification, clus-
tering, and phylogenetic reconstruction. Multiple views of data can be used to increase the
performance of machine learning algorithms for a variety of fields, but it is particularly im-
portant in the malware context because any single view is susceptible to a fixed obfuscation
strategy. While it is easy to make a single malware view unreliable, it is much harder to
obfuscate against all views simultaneously. I have shown that multiple views do indeed im-
prove performance for a variety of tasks including classification, clustering, and phylogenetic
graph reconstruction. To enable this analysis, I also developed a number of machine learning
algorithms that can exploit multiple data views.
7.1 Discussion
Finding a data representation that worked well with the sequence-based data derived from
the malware was the first step of this research. In Chapter 3 I presented the Markov chain
data representation. I showed how to define a kernel, or similarity function, on these Markov
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chains that can capture similarity on both the local and global structure of the Markov
chains. I modeled the dynamic instruction traces as Markov chains and the results presented
demonstrated that this representation was superior to that of the n-gram representation,
which had been extensively used in the malware literature.
Once I established the data representation, I then showed the importance of combin-
ing multiple views of the malware samples. The first problem I approached was that of
classification. Fortunately, there is a rich history of multiple view learning in the machine
learning literature. I was able to apply existing multiple kernel learning algorithms to solve
the multiview classification problem for malware, and I presented results that supported my
hypothesis that combining multiple views of malware would increase classification accuracy.
When analyzing malware, a simple yes/no answer is a good start, but knowing the
relationships between a new sample and previously seen samples is much more informative.
The ability to group malware samples into similar families has the potential to drastically
reduce the time to reverse engineer samples. For instance, members from the computer
security incidence response team at Los Alamos National Laboratory can spend several
weeks analyzing a new sample of malware. But, they can analyze a sample from a known
family, in which they have had previous experience reverse engineering, within several hours
to several days. I investigated this clustering problem in Chapter 5. Unlike the classification
problem, I had to develop novel machine learning algorithms to solve the multiple view
clustering problem. Earlier work required a priori information about the weights of the
views, which can be time-consuming to gather in the malware domain. These weights could
also drastically change between datasets. I showed that my multiview clustering approach
is superior to previous approaches used in the malware domain. I also showed that these
methods outperform competing methods on several machine learning benchmark datasets.
Finally, I presented my work on malware phylogenetics in Chapter 6. This line of re-
search will both help reverse engineers understand the evolution of malware they are currently
studying and help them attribute malware instances to known authors. I created a novel
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extension to graphical lasso to allow phylogenetic analysis from multiple views with no a
priori information on the importance of the individual views. Again I showed that incorpo-
rating multiple views of the data increased performance of the system on several datasets,
both benign and malicious.
There is a constant “arms race” between the people developing malicious code and those
detecting and understanding it. In this dissertation, I have introduced the multiview frame-
work for several important analysis problems, while developing novel machine learning al-
gorithms, applicable to fields outside of malware, when appropriate. I have shown how the
methods of this dissertation have succeeded despite the constant use of advanced obfuscation
techniques within the malware datasets. Moving toward a multiview analysis framework is
one way to raise the bar for malware authors, forcing them to devote more time and resources
into developing solutions that avoid detection.
7.2 Future Work
A theme throughout this dissertation was that of helping malware analysts do their job more
effectively. They are under severe time constraints to understand the malware’s functional-
ity and respond appropriately. The tools developed in the previous chapters will give the
analysts a significant head start, but there are future research avenues that could provide
further help.
Understanding the functions of a given piece of malware is a tedious process that can
last anywhere from a day to months, depending on the malware’s complexity. This process
usually requires the analyst to hand label different sections of the function call graph and
to slowly connect the “dots” into a picture of the malware’s logic. This provides an exciting
area to apply and extend the methods described in this dissertation.
This problem can be posed as a multi-class classification problem, where the labels would
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be the function the subroutine performs (e.g. data exfiltration), instead of the normal
labeling of benign vs malware. Two problems arise in this formulation: a data problem and
a methodology problem. First, getting a labeled dataset would require hundreds, or even
thousands, of hours from a skilled reverse engineer. And second, the Markov chain data
representation may have to be adjusted to account for a significantly shorter sequence of
instructions. For instance, the program instruction traces used throughout this dissertation
typically had several million instructions, whereas functions within a program typically have
several hundred.
In addition to new science directions, there are some interesting engineering applications
for the research already completed. It would be interesting to implement the phylogenetic
graph reconstruction presented in Chapter 6 within a system that classifies malware. This
would allow for a much deeper understanding of the network’s threat landscape, and would
allow the analysts tasked with attribution to do their jobs more efficiently.
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Appendix A
Multiple Kernel Learning Clustering
Proofs
A.1 Finding Ai for the Unnormalized Laplacian
The multiple views version of the unnormalized Laplacian is defined as:
Lun(β) =
M∑
i
βiDi −
M∑
i
βiKi
Plugging the unnormalized Laplacian into Equation 5.8:
tr
(
UT
(
M∑
i
βiDi −
M∑
i
βiKi
)
U
)
By rearranging terms:
= tr
(
UT
(
M∑
i
βi(Di −Ki)
)
U
)
= tr
(
M∑
i
βiU
T (Di −Ki)U
)
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Using the linearity of the trace function:
= tr
(
β0U
T (D0 −K0)U
)
+ · · ·+ tr (βMUT (DM −KM)U)
Finally, define Ai = U
T (Di −Ki)U .
A.2 Finding Ai for the Normalized Laplacian
The multiple views version of the normalized Laplacian is defined as:
Lnorm(β) = I −
(
M∑
i
βiDi
)−1( M∑
i
βiKi
)
Again, plugging the normalized Laplacian into Equation 5.8:
tr
UT
I −( M∑
i
βiDi
)−1( M∑
i
βiKi
)U

= tr(UT IU)− tr
UT ( M∑
i
βiDi
)−1( M∑
i
βiKi
)
U

Note that tr(UT IU) = γ is a constant and rearrange terms:
= γ − tr
UT
 M∑
i
βiKi
(
M∑
j
βjDj
)−1U
 (A.1)
By commuting the negative sign to inside the trace function, Ai for the normalized case
is now defined as:
Ai = U
T
−Ki( M∑
j
βjDj
)−1U
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Figure B.1: The ground truth phylogeny for the bagle worm.
B.1 Bagle
Bagle is a mass-mailing worm, that also creates a botnet [109]. It has the ability to download
external content, as well as spread through file-sharing networks, such as Kazaa, by placing
a copy of itself in the “share” folder. The specific variants used are highlighted in Table 6.1.
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Figure B.2: The ground truth phylogeny for the mytob worm.
B.2 Mytob
Mytob is a mass-mailing worm that seeks a user’s address book to then send itself to all
of that user’s contacts [111]. Several variations also have the ability to exploit network
vulnerabilities to spread without the need of it’s internal SMTP engine. The specific variants
used are highlighted in Table 6.1.
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Figure B.3: The ground truth phylogeny for the koobface worm.
B.3 Koobface
The Koobface worm spreads through social networking sites with the intent of installing
software for a botnet [110]. This worm updates a user’s status with a link to some type
of external media content, that is actually another copy of the worm. The specific variants
used are highlighted in Table 6.1.
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Figure B.4: The ground truth phylogeny for the Networkminer program.
B.4 NetworkMiner
NetworkMiner is a network forensics anaylsis tool specializing in packet sniffing and pars-
ing PCAP files. The NetworkMinder ground truth phylogeny was taken from its public
subversion repository [80]. The specific variants used are highlighted in Table 6.1.
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Figure B.5: The ground truth phylogeny for the mineserver program.
B.5 Mineserver
Mineserver is a way to host worlds in the popular Minecraft game. The Mineserver ground
truth was sampled from its github repository [78]. The specific variants used are highlighted
in Table 6.1.
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Computational Complexity of the
Methods
C.1 Complexity of the SVM
The computational complexity of the support vector machine needs to broken down into
two phases: training and testing. To begin the training, a kernel must first be defined. The
kernels that I have used are explained in Section 3.2. In the case of the Markov chain data
representation with n samples and a node set V , computing the Gaussian kernel (Equation
3.2) is O(n2 · |V |2). For the spectral kernel (Equation 3.4) computing the top-k eigenvectors
of Laplacian has O(k · |V |2) complexity bringing the total computational complexity of this
kernel to O(n2k · |V |+ k · |V |2). Training of the support vector machine can be in O(n · |α|)
where |α| is the number of support vectors found [85] bringing the total computational
complexity for the training of the combined kernel of Chapter 3 to O(n2 · |V |2 + n2k · |V |+
k · |V |2 + n · |α|).
Given a new sample, a kernel function, and the support vectors (α) given from the training
step, the sample can be classified with Equation 3.11. This function has computational
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complexity of O(|α| · (k · |V |2 + |V |2)) for the combined kernel approach of Chapter 3.
Empirical timings for these methods are given in Table 3.3
C.2 Complexity of the Multiview SVM
The computational complexity for the multiple kernel learning support vector machine is
composed of two parts: one to calculate the β vector and one for the α vector. Computing
α given β has the same complexity of normal SVM training and is explained in Appendix
C.1. Computing β has been shown to have complexity O(|αt|3 ·M |) where |αt| is the number
of non-zero support vectors at iteration t and M is the number of views [88]. Furthermore,
this algorithm has been shown to converge in O(log(M)/2) iterations where  is related to
the stopping criteria (see Equation 4.11) [101]. Therefore, the training complexity for M
views with a Gaussian kernel on the Markov chains would be O(∑Mi (n2 · |Vi|2)+log(M)/2 ·
(|αt|3 ·M |))
The testing phase of the multiview SVM is the same as the single SVM with more kernels
and the complexity for a Gaussian kernel on each view isO(|α|·(∑Mi |Vi|2)). Empirical timing
results for the Multiview SVM can be found in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.7.
C.3 Complexity of the Multiview Clustering
The multiview clustering algorithm of Chapter 5 is an iterative algorithm, and while there
is no formal convergence proof, I will note that the algorithm converged within 10 iterations
in all of the experiments. The algorithm is composed of two main parts: computing the
spectral clustering objective function to get U (Equation 5.8) and computing a semidefinite
program to find β (Equation 5.9). Computing Equation 5.8 can be done in O(n3) time where
n is the number of samples [74]. Equation 5.9 has a computational complexity of O(n6) in
107
Appendix C. Computational Complexity of the Methods
the worst case but has been shown to be O(n3) in the average case [17].
Empirical times to compute the optimization for the multiview clustering algorithms
based on the normalized and unnormalized Laplacian are presented in Table 5.4.
C.4 Complexity of the Multiview Graphical Lasso
Similar to the multiview clustering algorithm, the multiview graphical lasso algorithm is an
iterative algorithm with two main components. First, graphical lasso is solved given some β
vector specifying the weights of each view. Graphical lasso has a computational complexity of
O(n3) where n is the number of samples [119]. Next, β is updated with a quadratic program,
which has a computational complexity O(n3) where n is again the number of samples [120].
This algorithm converged within 15 iterations for all datasets presented in Chapter 6.
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Gaining Access to the Code/Data
Access to the code/data referenced herein is restricted. If you are an employee or a contractor
to the U.S. Government and are a U.S. citizen, you may be able to obtain access to the data.
Furthermore, Industrial and University partners with an active CRADA agreement with
LANS, LLC and U.S. citizenship may also be able to obtain access to the data. To do so,
please send an email to cyber@lanl.gov.
In Chapter 3, the support vector machine was trained using PyML [13]. For the results
of Chapter 3, I compared against 9 leading antivirus products: BitDefender [18], Kaspersky
[58], Avira [8], F-Secure [40], F-prot [37], Symantec [108], ClamAV [27], McAfee [77], and
AVG [7]. These results were gathered in September 2010 with the most current signature
databases.
In Chapter 4, the multiple kernel support vector machine was trained using the Shogun
library [102]. For these results, I compared against 11 leading antivirus products: BitDe-
fender [18], Kaspersky [58], Avira [8], F-Secure [40], F-prot [37], AVG [7], ClamAV [27],
Sophos [104], Symantec [108], McAfee [77], and Avast [6]. These results were gathered in
September 2011 with the most current signature databases.
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The semidefinite program in Chapter 5 and the quadratic program in Chapter 6 were
both solved for by using the CVXOPT python software for convex optimization [30]. The
graphical lasso optimization problem of Chapter 6 was solved by using the glasso R package
[42].
The malware from Chapters 3 and 4 were in part supplied by the Offensive Computing
malware repository [83], with other malware samples and benign samples being supplied by
a LANS, LLC CRADA partner. The malware from Chapter 5 was supplied by a LANS,
LLC CRADA partner. In Chapter 6, the three malicious families, i.e. Mytob, Koobface,
and Bagle, were obtained from VX Heaven [115]. The specific variants used are listed in
Table 6.1. The benign families, i.e. NetworkMiner and Mineserver, are available to download
from sourceforge for NetworkMiner [80] and github for Mineserver [78]. The variants used
are listed in Table 6.1.
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